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COMMENT 
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD: 
ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
SCREENING OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Adoption creates the legal relationship of parent and child 
and bestows on the adoptive parents all the rights and respon-
sibilities of that role. 1 Adoptive parents play the same role as 
biological parents in the life of their child. 2 Yet current law 
allows courts and adoption agencies to treat adoptive parents 
very differently from biological parents, often to the detriment 
of the children they seek to adopt. While biological parents are 
presumed fit to raise their children,3 adoptive parents are 
screened for fitness because of an "assumed risk that adoptive 
parenting won't work out."4 Many of the standards for screen-
1. JACK C. WESTMAN, CHILD ADVOCACY: NEW PROFESSIONAL ROLES FOR HELP-
ING FAMILIES 318 (1979), calling adoption an "ancient legal process creating the 
parent-child relationship." See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616 (West 1994), which 
provides, "After adoption, the adopted child and the adoptive parents shall sustain 
towards each other the legal relationship of parent and child and have all the 
rights and are subject to all the duties of that relationship." 
2. This comment will refer to parents who are raising their own biological 
children as "biological parents" and to parents whose biological children have been 
adopted by other parents as "birth parents." The role played by both adoptive and 
biological parents is that of nurturing, protecting and supervising their children. 
See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 
(1978), and Stanley v. lllinois, 405 U.S. 246 (1972), where biological fathers' in-
volvement in caring for their children was a decisive factor in determining their 
parental rights. 
3. Joan Heifitz Hollinger, Adoption Law, in 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 43, 
47 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993). 
4. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF 
167 
1
Hanan: Adoption Screening Process, Women's Law Forum
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
168 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:167 
ing adoptive parents are arbitrary and do little more than 
discourage potential parents from trying to adopt.5 
Some of these standards are more than arbitrary; they are 
discriminatory.s Until recently, states not only allowed but 
required agencies to screen out parents who were not the same 
race as the children they wished to adopt.7 Most states still 
allow similar discrimination on the basis of the age or marital 
status of potential adoptive parents. s Often, denials of adop-
PARENTING 34 (1993). 
5. Hollinger, supra note 3, at 48. Such standards include race, religion, eth-
nicity, appearance, income level, age, marital status, and residence address of the 
adopting parents. See infra part V, The Screening of Adoptive Parents. 
6. The United States Constitution, state constitutions, and many federal, 
state, and local laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race. Elizabeth 
Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in 
Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1226 (1991). These prohibitions have been 
interpreted to preclude the use of race as a decision-making factor by government 
agencies "not only in housing, employment, and public accommodations, but in 
virtually every area of our community life." [d. at 1226, 1229. Supporting anti-dis-
crimination laws is a "near-absolute presumption . . . that race is irrelevant to 
qualifications." [d. at 1237-1238. Increasingly, state and federal laws are extending 
this protection to prohibit discrimination based on other factors which are "irrele-
vant to qualifications" - factors such as age, disability, religion, and marital status, 
which are still used to screen adoptive parents. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra 
note 4, at 72. See infra part V, The Screening of Adoptive Parents, for a discus-
sion of the failure of race, age, and marital status to relate to qualification to 
parent. This comment will therefore refer to adoption screening criteria which 
would be illegal discrimination in other areas of the law and which do not relate 
to parental qualifications as discriminatory factors. 
7. Hollinger, supra note 3, at 48. See also former CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8708, 
8710 (West 1994), infra part V.A., Recent Reforms. Some states still require pref-
erence for same-race adoptions. See, e.g., MINN. STATS. ANN. § 259.29 (West Supp. 
1997), which, in relevant part provides: 
[d. 
The authorized child-placing agency shall give pref-
erence, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to 
placing the child with (a) a relative ... , (b) an impor-
tant friend with whom the child has resided or has signif-
icant contact, (c) a family with the same racial or ethnic 
heritage as the child, or ... (d) a family of different 
racial or ethnic heritage from the child which is knowl-
edgeable and appreciative of the child's racial or ethnic 
heritage ... 
If the child's birth parent or parents explicitly re-
quest that the preferences in (a), (b) or (c) not be fol-
lowed, the authorized child-placing agency shall honor 
that request. 
8. Generally adoption statutes do not explicitly prohibit single parent adop-
tions or prescribe a maximum age for adopting parents. In fact, many statutes 
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tive placements on these grounds result in separating a child 
from the foster parent or parents who have cared for the child 
for many years.9 In many other instances, children spend 
years in temporary foster homes before finding a permanent 
race-matched family.lO Some children never find a family. 11 
Adoption laws focus on the "best interest of the child,"12 yet 
denying and delaying adoptive placements based on discrimi-
natory factors which have little if anything to do with 
parenting ability is, in reality, in nobody's best interests. 
expressly provide that any single adult or married couple may adopt. See, e.g., 
WIS. STATS. ANN. § 48.82(1)(b) (West 1995). As to the age of the adopting parents, 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8601(a) (West 1994) merely requires the adoptive parents be at 
least ten years older than the child. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. c. 210 § 1 (West 
1987) provides that any adult may petition to adopt anyone younger than himself. 
Nevertheless, such discrimination occurs. A Wisconsin court pointed out that 
"Many adoption agencies have 'rules of thumb' as to the age for disqualifying 
adoptive parents." In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Wis. 1973). The same court 
denied the petition of a lesbian woman to adopt her lover's child in spite of a 
trial court finding that the adoption would be in the child's best interest, and in 
spite of the fact that the two women were in fact already raising the child togeth-
er. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 680-681 (Wis. 1994). 
9. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Ser-
vices, 563 F. Supp. 1200 (5th Cir. 1977); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 
318 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
10. See infra notes 147-148. 
11. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1188. 
12. The term "best interests of the child" is the standard by which courts and 
agencies are to determine decisions regarding adoption and child custody generally. 
See, e.g. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.01(2) (West 1987) stating "the best interests of the 
child shall always be of paramount consideration;" WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
26.33.045 (West Supp. 1997), discussing factors to consider in determining' "wheth-
. er a placement option is in a child's best interests"; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 
1129(1) (West Supp. 1997), which provides in relevant part: 
Id. 
The court shall grant a final decree of adoption if: *** 
(E) The petitioner is a suitable adopting parent and de-
sires to establish a parent and child relationship between 
the petitioner and the adoptee. 
(F) The best interests of the child are served by the adop-
tion. 
What is in the best interest of a child is often hard to define and open to 
differing interpretations. One court noted, for example, "nowhere in the Children's 
Code is there a definition of 'best interests of the child.' Likewise, the case law of 
this state is quite barren of definite guidelines or factors which constitute the 
concept of 'best interests.' " In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Wis. 1973). That 
court defined the best interests of the child this way: ''The sole issue is whether 
the grandparents [who had petitioned to adopt their grandson] can provide food, 
shelter, clothing, love and affection, education and training which will aid the 
child to develop his full potential as a human being.» Id. at 869. 
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Eliminating such standards in favor of individual assess-
ment of parental fitness would benefit children in two impor-
tant ways. First, it would allow them to be adopted more 
quickly into permanent, stable homes. Second, it would pre-
vent the unnecessary break-up of nurturing foster families. 13 
Such a change would also be more consistent with the tradi-
tional protection afforded families under the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 
One difficulty in reforming the system is that most of the 
rules denying or delaying adoptions due to factors such as age, 
race, and marital status, are not the law. Rather, they are 
unwritten rules and practices of adoption agencies, which enjoy 
great discretion in making adoption placement decisions. 15 
The problem with the current state of adoption law is that it 
allows agencies to use race as "one among many factors," 
which, in practice, means it is often the deciding factor.16 
This comment will propose eliminating race and all factors 
that would be discriminatory in any other area of the law from 
consideration in adoption placement decisions, focusing instead 
on assessments of the parenting skills of individual prospective 
adoptive parents, and giving preference to foster parents or 
others who are already providing care to the child. Part II will 
discuss the historical precedents of today's adoption laws and 
show how the misperception of the adoptive family as inferior 
to the biological family helped to shape the current law. 17 
13. See supra note 9. 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XN, § 1 in relevant part provides: 
"No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." Id. 
Some cases challenging denials of adoptions focus on a substantive due 
process liberty interest in continuing the family bonds that have formed between 
children and the foster parents seeking to adopt them. See, e.g., Smith v. Organi-
zation of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 815 (1977), infra Section IV A 1. Other cases 
focus instead on the Equal Protection Clause, which is implicated when adoption 
denials are premised solely on the races of the prospective adoptive parents and 
children. In such cases, children are harmed by delays in permanent placement 
based on their race. See, e.g., In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996), infra part IV.B.2. 
15. See infra note 269 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra note 268 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 24-69 and accompanying text. 
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Part III will describe the process of adopting a child18 to dem-
onstrate that adoption agencies need not look to factors such 
as the age, race, or marital status of parents. Part IV will show 
how the current adoption screening system violates constitu-
tionally protected family rights. 19 Part V rejects practices of 
adoptions based on improper factors. 2o 
Part VI21 examines recent legislation in three states 
which make strides toward achieving these goalS.22 Part VII 
will recommend that states change their adoption laws to for-
bid courts and adoption agencies from considering discrimina-
tory factors in placement decisions, and to offer a remedy for 
violations of these standards.23 This part will also recommend 
giving a preference to prospective adoptive parents who are 
already caring for the child. 
II. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS FOR MODERN ADOPTION 
LAW 
The notion that adoption is an inferior way to create a 
family has negatively influenced the development of adoption 
law. The earliest adoption laws and practices were designed to 
imitate the biological family through rituals to simulate child-
birth, and, in one early system, through a form of ethnic 
matching.24 The British common law system, from which most 
of United States law evolved, also favored the biological family, 
so much so that it did not provide for legal adoptions at all.25 
The misperception of the adoptive family as a second-best 
imitation of the "real family" continues today and forms the 
basis for much of the restrictive screening system.26 Changing 
societal views of race relations have shaped modern laws and 
18. See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 86-152 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 153-245 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 246-294 and accompanying text. 
22. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8708-8710 (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. 
§ 722.957 (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 19 § 1129 (West Supp. 1997). 
23. See infra notes 295-314 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 161-169 and accompanying text. 
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practices in the area of interracial adoptions, one of the most 
restrictive areas of the screening system.27 
This general overview helps to put current practices in 
context by outlining the roots of adoption law. Part A discusses 
the ancient adoption practices which tried to imitate the bio-
logical family.28 Part B traces the development of United 
States adoption law from the informal adoptions in England 
and in the colonial period to the enactment of adoption stat-
utes in each state. Part C traces the history of interracial 
adoption in the United States. 
A. ANCIENT ADOPTIONS 
Adoption is an "ancient legal process" which creates a 
parent-child relationship.29 Four thousand years ago, this pro-
cess included rituals designed to "make the adopted child the 
same as if it had been born to" the adopting parents.30 For 
example, adopting mothers held their new babies under their 
robes and allowed them to drop to the ground in an imitation 
of childbirth.31 Most adoptions, however, did not involve in-
fants; in fact, adoption of adults was common,32 since the pur-
pose of ancient adoption laws was to provide an heir for the 
adopting parents.33 Such adoptions were accomplished by cer-
emonies in which the adoptee pledged loyalty to his new family 
and severed all ties to the old family.34 
27. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. 
28. This comment uses the term "ancient adoptions" to refer to the Roman, 
Hindu, and Mesopotamian adoption systems of two to four thousand years ago. 
29. WESTMAN, supra note 1, at 318. 
30. ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 25 (1978). 
31. Id. 
32. Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents of American Adoption, in 3 THE FuTURE OF 
CHILDREN 17 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993). 
33. SOROSKY, supra note 3D, at 26-27. 
34. Id. at 26. The modern equivalent of this practice was found in the prac-
tice, common in the middle part of this century, of sealing adoption records and 
placing children in "a home unknown to the natural parents so that the relation-
ship of the adoptive parents to the child may become one of love, affection, and 
loyalty based upon the acceptance by the child of the adoptive parents as his 
parents ... " In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 871 (Wis. 1973). See infra notes 60-
61 and accompanying text on the problems of sealed adoption records and the 
adopted child's need to know his history. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss2/3
1997] ADOPTION SCREENING PROCESS 173 
The purpose of these rituals was to transform the new 
heirs to be "artificially blood relatives."35 Although adopted 
children were entitled to inherit from their adoptive parents,36 
blood relationships were central in defining "family." Adoptees 
hid the fact that they were not related to their families by 
blood. They could not tell anyone they were adopted or seek 
out their birth parents under penalty of law.37 Ancient Hindu 
adoptions involved careful matching of caste and clan to be 
sure the adoptive parents and child were as similar as possi-
ble.38 Despite the care with which ancient adoptions simulat-
ed biological relationships, Hammurabi's Code allowed an 
adoptive father to "send back" an adopted child who "trans-
gressed.,,39 These notions of the adoptive family as an inferior 
imitation of the biological family continue to shape adoption 
law, in spite of evidence that the emotional bonds within fami-
lies, rather than blood ties; are crucial to children's best inter-
ests!O 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES ADOPTION LAw 
United States adoption law, loosely based on ancient Ro-
man adoption law, is one of the few areas of American law not 
derived from British common law.41 Bloodlines were so impor-
tant in Britain that even distant relatives were preferred over 
adoptive children in inheritance, and legal adoption was not 
available there until 1926.42 An apprenticeship system provid-
ed homes and surrogate families for orphaned children.43 In 
35. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 26. The goal of the adopting parents was con-
tinuity in their family lines. 1d. 
36. 1d. at 27. 
37. 1d. at 25. The penalty for revealing an adoptee's background was draconian 
- his tongue would be cut out. 1d. 
38. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 28. Modern adoption agencies have sometimes 
followed this practice so rigidly that they have attempted to place children only 
with adoptive parents whose hair and eye color and facial features were similar to 
those of the children's birth parents. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family, 
563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977). 
39. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 25. 
40. See JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
17 (1993), noting that children form emotional attachments to adults based upon 
the nurturing and care they provide, not upon their biological or legal relationship. 
41. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 28. 
42. 1d. 
43. 1d. at 30. 
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an apprenticeship, a child trained for a profession in the home 
of an artisan.« The artisan's family provided emotional sup-
port to the child and became, in essence, the child's "second 
family," though not legally recognized as such.45 
This system of artisans and their families "adopting" ap-
prentices continued in the United States in its early years.46 
"Almshouses" provided care for orphaned babies and children 
who were too young to be apprenticed.47 During this period, 
neighbors and relatives were also taking in orphaned children 
and "emotionally adopting" them.4s These families wanted 
laws that would give their children rights to inherit from 
them.49 Meanwhile, the system of almshouses and apprentice-
ships, which had once alleviated the need for adoption laws by 
providing homes and surrogate families for children, was be-
coming overwhelmed by the growing number of orphaned and 
abandoned children.50 Prior to 1851, however, there were still 
no formal adoption laws.51 
Massachusetts passed the first adoption statute in the 
United States in 1851 in response to these needs.52 This stat-
ute was patterned after the adoption laws of ancient Rome, 
since there was no British common law precedent for legal 
adoption. 53 The Massachusetts statute added one very impor-
tant innovation: it emphasized the needs of the adopted 
child.54 By 1929, all states had enacted similar laws, empha-
44. [d. at 29. 
45. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 29. 
46. [d. at 30. 
47. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 18. 
48. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 31. 
49. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 18. At the same time, social reformers demand-
ed protection for children caught in an often abusive system of orphan labor which 
had become a part of the apprentice system. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 32. 
50. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 17-18. Factors that contributed to the rapid 
growth of homeless children were the industrial revolution, urbanization, and im-
migration. [d. at 19. 
51. [d. at 17. 
52. Mass. Stat. 1851, ch. 324 §§ 1-4 (enacted 1851), now at MAss. GEN. LAwS 
ANN. c. 210 § 1 et seq. (West 1987). 
53. SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 32. 
54. [d. The statute protected the interests of adopted children by providing 
that an adoption must be approved by a judge, and that the judge could only 
approve an adoption if he were satisfied that the prospective adoptive parents 
"were of 'sufficient ability to bring up the child' and that it was 'fit and proper 
8
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sizing the best interests of the child. 55 
Until the 1920's, adoption of newborn babies was extreme-
ly rare.56 Because infant formula did not yet exist, feeding a 
newborn was impossible without the help of a wetnurse.57 Ba-
bies needing milk vastly outnumbered women able to provide 
this service, so the infant mortality rate was extraordinarily 
high.58 Once the invention of formula removed this obstacle, 
childless couples began to see adoption as a viable way to have 
the baby they had been unable to conceive.59 
The practice of sealing adoption records and keeping the 
identities of birth parents and adoptive parents hidden from 
each other began around the same time as the increase in 
infant adoptions as a way to quickly integrate the child into 
the adoptive family.60 This practice was later criticized for 
ignoring the adopted child's need to know about her heritage 
and have a complete sense of identity. The system, however, 
recognized children's important needs to be part of the adop-
tive family, to have not only roofs over their heads, but "homes 
in families.))61 
that such adoption should take effect: " Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 18. 
55. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 2l. 
56. Id. at 22. 
57. Id. at 21. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 22. 
60. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 21-22. This practice was designed to help the 
child fully and quickly integrate into his adoptive family. Id. at 25. In part it was 
to protect against any possibility of interference in the child's life by his birth par-
ents. In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 870-871 (Wis. 1973). In part it was based on 
the idea that the only way for an adopted child to become a part of the adoptive 
family was, in essence, to pretend the child was not adopted by completely break-
ing any and all ties to the birth parents. See, e.g., Bartholet, Where Do Black 
Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1173, noting that "the laws and policies sur-
rounding adoption in this country have generally structured adoption in imitation 
of biology, giving the adopted child a new birth certificate as if the child had been 
born to the adoptive parents, sealing off the birth parents as if they had never 
existed . . . " In fact, the prevailing view in the mid-twentieth century was that 
the child should not be told he was adopted. In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d at 871. 
Both the sealed adoption records controversy and the possibility of maintaining 
ties between birth families and adoptive families through open adoption are be-
yond the scope of this article. 
61. Sokoloff, supra note 32, at 25. 
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c. THE HISTORY OF INTERRACIAL ADOPTIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Interracial adoptions were virtually unheard of until the 
late 1940's.62 Almost any interracial association was virtually 
unheard of at this time.63 After World War II and the Korean 
and Vietnam Wars, many American families adopted Asian 
children who were left orphaned and homeless by those 
wars.54 Also beginning in the 1950's and 1960's, adoptions of 
children from Latin American countries by white couples be-
came popular.65 In the late 1960's and early 1970's, 10,000 
black children were adopted by white parents.66 At that time, 
adoption agencies approved of interracial adoptions as a way of 
finding homes for the large number of minority children wait-
ing to be adopted.67 
The practice of allowing interracial adoptions changed in 
1972 after the National Association of Black Social Workers 
(NABSW) objected to the practice, concerned that African-
American children were not able to develop a positive self-
image or awareness of their heritage in white families. 68 The 
62. Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of Transracial Adoption, in 3 THE FuTuRE 
OF CHILDREN 104 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993). 
63. As late as the 1960's the insult used by supporters of segregation against 
civil rights activists was "race-mixer." Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? 
supra note 6, at 1176. These people "saw the mixing of the races in the intimate 
context of the family as the ultimate symbol of [what they saw as] the outrage 
and degradation threatened by moves towards a more integrated society." Id. At 
the time, interracial marriage was still illegal in many states. See infra note 178 
and accompanying text. The segregationist origins of adoption race-matching are 
discussed in detail by Julie C. Lythcott-Haims in Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? 
Racial Classification in America and Its Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29 
HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 531 (1994). 
64. Silverman, supra note 62, at 104-105. 
65. Id. at 105. Interracial adoptions usually involve white parents or interra-
cial couples with one white parent. See infra note 197. 
66. Silverman, supra note 62, at 105. 
67. Id. Among the factors leading to this trend included an increasing need for 
homes for minority children and a growing acceptance of racial integration in 
general. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best 
Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925, n. 3 (1994). 
68. Silverman, supra note 62, at 105-106. Ways of dealing with these valid 
concerns other than denying interracial adoptions will be discussed in Section V.B., 
Screening on the Basis of Race, and Section VII, Recommendations to Improve the 
Screening System. Opposition to interracial adoption is not based entirely on con-
10
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NABSW has not changed its position, but the laws that once 
stood in the way of interracial adoptions have recently begun 
to change.69 
III. THE CURRENT ADOPTION PROCESS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
There are two basic types of adoptions. In agency adop-
tions, a state agency or department or a private, state-licensed 
adoption agency matches children with prospective adoptive 
parents.70 An independent adoption, on the other hand, is ar-
ranged directly between the birth parents and adoptive par-
ents. 71 Significantly, the screening criteria used in agency 
adoptions generally do not apply in independent adoptions.72 
For this reason, many birth parents who voluntarily give up 
their babies for adoption choose independent adoption.73 Pri-
vate adoption agencies are also less likely than public state 
agencies to focus on race and other discriminatory screening 
cern for the welfare of interracially adopted children. The NABSW, for example, 
calls interracial adoption "cultural genocide," and opposes it fearing interracial 
adoption might have adverse effects on preservation of culture for the African-
American commUnity as a whole. Preservation of minority cultures is a laudable 
goal, but when the NABSW and other opponents of interracial adoption advocate 
leaving minority children in foster care with no permanent home, they advance 
this goal at the expense of those children. Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Note, Where 
Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classification in America and Its Implications for 
Transracial Adoption, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 531, 551 (1994). Interestingly, 
there is far less opposition to interracial adoption of children from foreign coun-
tries. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1175. For a 
discussion of the race-matching scheme's failure to enhance and protect African-
American culture, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Place-
ment: the Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REv. 925 
(1994). 
69. See infra note 246. 
70. Mark McDermott, The Case for Independent Adoption, in 3 THE FuTuRE OF 
CHILDREN 147, 150 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993). 
71. Bryce J. Christensen, Two Cheers for Independent Adoption, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 3, 1987, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. Often a lawyer or other 
intermediary introduces the two sets of parents. Id. 
72. See BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, noting that prospective adop-
tive parents can avoid the screening system through independent adoption. Id. 
73. Bryce J. Christensen, Two Cheers for Independent Adoption, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 3, 1987, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. Birth parents choose inde-
pendent adoption to avoid temporary foster care placement of their babies while 
agencies wait for adoptive families who meet the screening criteria. Id. Another 
reason birth parents choose independent adoption is to avoid procedural delays 
often involved in agency adoptions. Id. 
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factors; as a result, many minority birth parents choose private 
rather than public agencies.74 Of course, not all children 
placed for adoption are newborn babies voluntarily relin-
quished by their birth parents; many children are placed for 
adoption after a court has terminated the parental rights of 
their abusive or neglectful parents.75 These birth parents do 
not have any say in what kind of screening process determines 
who will adopt their children.76 Their children are the ones 
most adversely affected by the current agency screening sys-
tem. 77 
Once prospective parents find a child to adopt, they must 
file a petition for adoption with a COurt.78 All states require 
some form of home study to determine the prospective adoptive 
parents' fitness as parents and whether they are the best par-
ents to raise the individual child they want to adopt.79 The 
qualities adoption agency workers look for in potential adop-
tive parents are maturity, sensitivity to human needs, and 
tolerance towards the unmarried birth parents of their adop-
tive children. so The ways in which the parents deal with cri-
74. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1234, noting 
that many African-American birth parents choose private adoption agencies over 
public agencies because many such agencies place a higher priority on immediately 
finding adoptive homes than on race-matching, unlike public agencies. 
75. Hollinger, supra note 3, at 45. Additionally, some birth parents relinquish 
custody of their children to state agencies when threatened with involuntary termi-
nation proceedings. [d. 
76. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1234, n. 203. 
77. Most healthy black babies available for adoption do find homes, while older 
minority children do not. [d. at 1203. In part, this is because many agencies that 
race-match also actively recruit black families. [d. Such agencies are able to find 
homes for these babies. [d. Minority children free for adoption after termination of 
parental rights, however, wait for years for permanent families. [d. at 1203-04. 
This comment will focus on agency adoptions because that is where the 
screening factors cause the most harm. Independent adoption is mentioned only as 
a basis for comparison, to show that the screening factors are unnecessary. 
78. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8802 (West 1994) provides in relevant part: 
[A] person with whom a child has been placed for adoption, who desires to adopt 
a child may, for ,that purpose, file a petition in the county in which the petitioner 
resides. [d. 
79. McDermott, supra note 70, at 150. Generally, in independent adoption, the 
home study serves only to determine parental fitness. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 
8807 (West 1994) (adoption agency or county department must investigate the pro-
spective adoptive parents within 180 days of birth parents giving their consent 
and report findings to the court). 
80. LINDA CANNON BURGESS, THE ART OF ADOPTION 3, 11, 15 (1977). Burgess 
12
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ses, the stability of their marriage, and their relationships with 
friends and family are also important.8t Agencies consider the 
prospective adoptive parents' finances to be an important con-
sideration, but find that ability to manage money is more sig-
nificant than income leve1.82 One of the most important con-
siderations is the prospective parents' motivation to adopt.83 If 
the parents want a child to solve problems that having a child 
simply will not solve, they may not be suitable parents.84 Sim-
ilarly, if the parents are committed to their decision to adopt 
they will be better parents to an adopted child than parents 
who are not completely sure this is the way they want to add a 
child to their family.85 In spite of birth parents' preference for 
an adoption process which does not focus on discriminatory 
factors, and in spite of the elaborate process already in place to 
assess parental ability on an individual basis, agencies contin-
ue to deny adoptions based on these factors. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE FAMILY 
Not only are screening criteria based on race, age, marital 
status, and similar factors unnecessary and harmful to chil-
dren by delaying and denying adoptions, they are constitution-
ally suspect. United States Supreme Court decisions have 
interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to provide constitutional protection for family relation-
ships.86 Although the biological link between parents and chil-
is a former adoption agency director. 
81. Id. at 3, 12. 
82. Id. at 12. See also In re B.L.S., 901 S.W.2d 38 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995). The 
trial court found an adoption by the child's aunt, who had cared for her since she 
was a newborn baby, was not in the child's best interest, in large part because 
the aunt was on disability and received Aid to Families with Dependant Children 
benefits. Id. at 39-40. The appellate court reversed, noting that the aunt's income, 
low as it was, was enough to meet her expenses. Id. at 40. 
83. BURGESS, supra note 80, at 12-13. 
84. Id. at 12. 
85. Id. at 13, 15. 
86. Such protection stems from the Supreme Court's decision that family rela-
tionships are "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees." Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). See, e.g., 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage is a fundamental right); Loving 
v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to choose marriage partner); Griswold v. Con-
necticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couple to decide to use contracep-
tives so they would not have children); Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942) 
13
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dren is often the focus of cases which deal with the protection 
of their relationships, it is not the only basis for such protec-
tion.s7 Because of the many non-biological bases for constitu-
tional protection of family relationships, the author will dem-
onstrate how the same constitutional protection may be ex-
tended to the relationships between children and the potential 
adoptive parents who have already cared for them. Further-
more, children may also have fundamental liberty interests in 
a stable home and in preserving their emotional bonds with 
the people who take care of them.ss 
A. PARENTAL RIGHTS ARE BASED ONLY IN PART ON THE BIO-
LOGICAL LINK 
Many cases dealing with the protection of the family deal 
with families related biologically.s9 Biology alone, however, is 
not the only basis for constitutional protection of families in 
general, and the relationship of parents and children, in partic-
ular.gO Other bases include the emotional bonds between fami-
ly members and the assumption that parents will act in their 
children's best interests. 
(procreation is a fundamental right); Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to make decisions re-
garding children's education). 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is also relevant 
in cases involving race-matching, because in such cases, agencies treat prospective 
adoptive parents and children waiting for homes differently on the basis of their 
race. See supra note 14. See infra notes 136-150 and accompanying text, discussing 
In re Bridget R. 49 Cal. Rptr. 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), an Equal Protection chal-
lenge to a race-matching scheme. 
87. These include the emotional bonds between family members, and the im-
portance of parents in protecting their children's interests. See infra Section IV.A. 
for a discussion of cases focusing on these bases. 
88. Although the United States Supreme Court has not decided whether chil-
dren have a constitutionally-protected interest in their relationships with their 
parents, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1988), California courts do 
recognize that children have rights to a stable family and to protection and care. 
In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1307 (Cal. 1994). . 
89. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 
U.S. 816, 843 (1977) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), which 
called the rights to "conceive and raise one's children" essential). 
90. Smith, 431 U.S. at 843-844. 
14
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1. Emotional Bonds as a Reason to Protect Family Relation-
ships 
The family is important enough in society to merit consti-
tutional protection in part because of the importance to indi-
viduals of the emotional bonds that develop in "the intimacy of 
daily association, and from the role [the family] plays in 'pro-
moting a way of life' through the instruction of children. »91 In 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, the United States 
Supreme Court considered whether foster families should be 
afforded the same type of protection to which biological fami-
lies are entitled.92 Although the Court ultimately did not de-
cide this issue,93 Justice Brennan, writing the plurality opin-
ion of the Court, indicated that foster families may indeed be 
entitled to some constitutional protection, at least in the case 
of long-term placements where the foster family is the child's 
de facto family.94 Justice Brennan reasoned that the emotion-
al attachments that develop in such families are just as strong 
91. [d. at 844 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972». 
92. [d. at 818-820. In Smith, foster parents challenged the state's power to 
remove children from their homes. Some of the children involved were being 
moved to other foster homes, others were to be reunited with their biological par-
ents. [d. at 818-819, n. 1. These foster parents were not seeking to adopt the 
children in their care, whose biological parents still had parental rights. [d. Smith 
is nevertheless relevant to the issue of the adoption screening system since adop-
tion agencies often ignore the relationships that develop within long-term foster 
families, focusing instead on the races of the parents and' child and on other dis-
criminatory factors. 
93. [d. at 847. The Court did not need to decide this issue, instead holding 
that a New York law allowing social services departments to remove children from 
foster homes at its discretion did not violate any liberty interest the foster fami-
lies may have because it afforded them a fair opportunity to contest the planned 
removals - in other words, it afforded them due process of law before the children 
were removed from their homes. [d. at 856. Despite this narrow ground for up-
holding the foster care laws, Justice Brennan "took great pains to analyze the 
assertion of the foster parents and foster children that they had a constitutionally-
protected liberty interest. A careful reading of the opinion indicates . . . that but 
for the narrower ground . . . the Court would readily have determined that such 
[a] constitutionally protected liberty interest did exist." Drummond v. Fulton Coun-
ty Dep't of Family and Children's Services, 563 F.2d 1200, 1213 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(Tuttle, J., dissenting). The Drummond majority, however, held that children do 
not have a liberty interest in their relationships with potential adoptive/foster 
parents, relying primarily on Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), which held 
that an adult prisoner had no liberty interest in a stable environment which 
would preclude transfer to another prison. Drummond, 536 F.2d at 1208-1209. 
94. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844-45. "We cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere 
collection of unrelated individuals." [d. 
15
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as those that develop in families related by blood.95 
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan found reasons for any pa-
rental rights for foster parents to be weaker than those of 
biological parents. For one thing, foster care is meant to be 
temporary.96 Furthermore, foster parents provide care to chil-
dren over whom a state agency has legal custody through a 
contractual relationship with that agency.97 The foster family 
relationship is one in which "the State has been a partner from 
the outset."9S Finally, placement of the child in foster care, 
unlike adoption, does not terminate all the rights of the biolog-
ical parent to the child.99 Thus, the biological parents still 
have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in protecting 
their relationship with the child, which conflicts with the foster 
parents' interests. 100 
The reasons Justice Brennan found for limiting the paren-
tal rights of foster parents only make sense, however, when 
foster parents seek to block the return of foster children to 
their biological parents. When foster parents seek to adopt a 
child who has been in their care for a long time, the foster care 
arrangement, while intended to be temporary, has, in reality, 
become indefinite.101 The relationships within a such a foster 
family is thus more like the relationships within biological 
families which are protected. If the biological parents' rights 
have been terminated, there is no longer a competing interest 
to protect. The reasoning of the plurality opinion indicates that 
given a proper case, the Supreme Court might very well hold 
that a child and her foster parents have a constitutionally 
95. Before analyzing the legal issues involved, Justice Brennan described in 
detail the realities of New York's foster care system, pointing out that although 
foster care is meant to be a temporary substitute for care by biological parents 
who are unable to care for the child, children often stay in foster care for many 
years. Id. at 833, 836. Many foster children have little or no contact with their 
biological parents. Id. at 836, n. 39. Where a child remains in one foster family 
for a long time and has no contact with his biological parents, "it is natural," as 
Justice Brennan pointed out, "that the foster family should hold the same place in 
the emotional life of the child ... as the natural family." Id. at 844. 
96. Smith, 431 U.S. at 834. 
97. Id. at 826-27. 
98. Id. at 845. 
99. Id. at 827. 
100. Id. at 846. 
101. See supra note 95. 
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protected interest in protecting their "family-like association," 
free from "arbitrary government interference."lo2 
2. Parental Responsibility for the Child's Well-Being as a 
Basis for Parental Rights 
Parental rights are protected, both constitutionally and by 
state statutes, based in part on the assumption that parents 
will act to protect their children's best interests. The California 
Court of Appeals for the Second District discussed this basis 
for familial rights in In re Bridget R. 103 The United States 
Supreme Court discussed this basis in Quilloin v. Walcott. 104 
These two decisions demonstrate that the responsibility par-
ents assume in caring for their children can play a central role 
in the prote,ction of parental rights. 
The Bridget R. court noted that under California law, 
"children are not merely chattels belonging to their parents, 
but have fundamental interests of their own. Such fundamen-
tal interests are of constitutional dimension."lo5 The court 
noted that United States Supreme Court cases recognizing 
constitutional protection for parental rights have done so at 
least in part based on the notion that "children's needs gener-
ally are best met by helping parents achieve their inter-
ests."106 In Lehr v. Robertson, for instance, the Supreme 
Court noted that "the rights of parents are a counterpart of the 
responsibilities they have assumed."lo7 
102. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846. See also Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1212-1214 
(Tuttle, J., dissenting), noting that Justice Brennan could have chosen to uphold 
the New York law based on the adequate opportunity it provided foster parents to 
challenge the removals of children without analyzing the potential rights of foster 
families. Judge Tuttle suggested that Justice Brennan intentionally devoted several 
pages of dicta to discussing the possible familial rights of foster families. Id. 
103. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
104. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977). 
105. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 507, 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citing In re 
Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1307 (Cal. 1994)). These rights include the right to be 
protected from abuse and neglect and a right to a secure and stable home ([d. at 
524, citing In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d at 1307), and will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section. 
106. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
759-761 (1982) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972)). 
107. Id. (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983)). 
17
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In Quilloin v. Walcott, the United States Supreme Court 
demonstrated this principle when it considered the responsibil-
ity an unwed biological father had taken for his child's care in 
determining his parental rights. lOS The father, Leon Quilloin, 
who had established a relationship with his son, wanted to 
block the adoption of the eleven-year-old boy by his step-fa-
ther.l09 Georgia law required the consent of both parents of a 
child born during a marriage to the child's adoption, but re-
quired only the consent of the mother if the parents were not 
wed when the child was conceived.110 Mr. Quilloin challenged 
this distinction on equal protection grounds.1ll Georgia's stat-
utes, he claimed, denied to him a right they granted to ma,rried 
or divorced fathers with no adequate basis for the distinc-
tion. 112 The Court, however, found adequate grounds for the 
distinction in the fact that Mr. Quilloin, unlike a married or 
divorced father, had "never exercised actual or legal custody 
over his child, and thus [had] never shouldered any significant 
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, 
protection, or care of the child." 113 Thus, the individual 
father's role in protecting his child's interest was significant 
enough to affect his rights regarding his child. 
Since the responsibility parents have for protecting their 
children's interests does not depend upon a biological relation-
ship, neither should the rights that go with it.114 Foster par-
ents seeking to adopt assume this same responsibility as soon 
as they begin to care for the child. Other prospective adoptive 
parents actively seek this responsibility when they submit 
themselves to the adoption screening process. In doing so, 
these parents demonstrate their commitment to fulfilling the 
parental responsibilities emphasized by the courts as a basis 
for parental rights.115 This basis for parental rights should 
108. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977). 
109. Id. at 247. 
110. Id. at 248. 
111. Id. at 252. 
112. Id. 
113. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256. 
114. Id. at 525. This principle was recognized by the California Supreme Court 
in In re Michael R., 898 P.2d 891, 899 (Cal. 1995), and by the United States Su-
preme Court in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 261. 
115. In seeking to adopt, prospective adoptive parents demonstrate not only a 
desire to parent, but a strong commitment to do so. Adoptive parents must find a 
18
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thus apply to potential adoptive parents in exactly the same 
way it applies to biological parents. 
B. THE RIGHT OF CHILDREN TO STABLE FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 
California courts recognize that children have their own 
fundamental rights in family relationships. The California 
Supreme Court discussed and applied this principle in In re 
Jasmon 0. 116 Two years later, the California Court of Ap-
peals for the Second District discussed the possible constitu-
tional foundations for familial rights for children in In re 
Bridget R.ll7 These cases show that California courts consider 
the importance of stable, pennanent relationships for children 
in detennining familial rights. 
1. In re Jasmon O. 
In In re Jasmon 0., the California Supreme Court dis-
cussed the familial rights of children when it decided that a 
family court had not violated a father's constitutional rights by 
tenninating his parental rights to his seven-and-a-half-year-old 
daughter. us The child, Jasmon, had been placed in foster 
care at the age of six months because neither parent was able 
to care for her.u9 The mother's rights were tenninated earli-
er, but the father made a major transfonnation in his life, 
child to adopt, and must be approved as adoptive parents both by a social worker 
conducting a home study and by a court. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying 
text. Finding a child can take three to seven years, at least for parents looking 
for an infant. Review and Outlook (Editorial): The Adoption Option, WALL ST. J., 
July 7, 1989, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. The home study process can 
be very intrusive on the privacy of the prospective adoptive parents, and also very 
time-consuming. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 33-34. Elizabeth 
Bartholet, a leading adoption expert, states: "I would be prepared to assume that 
those who push forward to pursue adoption under these circumstances will, as a 
general matter, be at least as committed and fit a parent group as non-adoptive 
parents, many of whom fall into parenting without any conscious choice whatsoev-
er. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1207. 
116. In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297 (Cal. 1994). 
117. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
118. In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297 (Cal. 1994). 
119. Id. at 1300. The baby's father had a drug problem. Id. The mother was a 
sixteen-year-old girl living in a halfway house for mentally ill patients. Id. at 
1314. The young birth mother voluntarily placed Jasmon in foster care and did 
not contest termination of her parental rights. [d. at 1300. 
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recovering from drug addiction and maintaining visitation with 
J asmon. 120 The trial court did not find that the father was 
unfit to parent any child,121 but nevertheless found that it 
was in Jasmon's best interests to allow her foster parents to 
adopt her rather than to disrupt her bond with them.122 Her 
father was not able to establish a close relationship with his 
child or to understand her anxiety at the prospect of losing her 
relationship with the foster parents who had cared for her 
since infancy.123 The court found that he was therefore un-
able to meet Jasmon's needs. 124 
In deciding that termination of Jasmon's father's parental 
rights did not violate his constitutional interest in preserving 
their relationship, the court discussed Jasmon's rights. The 
court noted that children, like their parents, have fundamental 
rights, including the right to be protected from neglect and the 
right to a stable and permanent home. 125 These interests 
sometimes conflict with the interests of parents.126 When that 
happens, the child's rights and the parents' must be bal-
anced. 127 Thus, at least according to California courts, pro-
tecting a child's family relationships is not only in that child's 
best interests, it is within the child's fundamental rights. 128 
120. Id. at 1300. 
121. Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d at 1310. Justice Mosk, however, writing for the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, pointed out that the trial court "discounted the evidence 
that the father was incapable of acting as an adequate parent to any child .... " 
Id. 
122. Id. at 1304. 
123. Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d at 1300. 
124. Id. at 1310. 
125. Id. at 1307. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Although both Jasmon O. and In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1996), infra notes 129-146 and accompanying text, deal with protecting 
the bonds a child has already formed with adoptive parents or potential adoptive 
foster parents, allowing children to form bonds with a permanent family as early 
as possible is just as much a requirement of a right to a stable and permanent 
home as protecting such bonds once they are formed. See infra notes 148, 185. 
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2. In re Bridget R. 
More recently, in In re Bridget R., a California appellate 
court examined the holdings of some United States Supreme 
Court cases and concluded that these fundamental rights of 
children are protected not only by California courts, but also by 
the United States Constitution.129 The Bridget R. court noted 
that the United States Supreme Court has referred to the 
relationship between parent and child as being constitutionally 
protected. 130 Supreme Court decisions have based a parent's 
fundamental rights in part on the parent's role in protecting 
the child's fundamental rights. 131 The Bridget R. court rea-
soned that children's familial rights may be even more funda-
mental than the rights of their parents. 132 Children's inter-
ests include .not only preservation of an emotional bond, but 
also the "elementary ... needs of the small and helpless to be 
protected from harm and to have stable and permanent homes 
in which each child's mind and character can grow, unham-
pered by uncertainty and fear of what the next ... court ap-
pearance may bring.,,133 The current screening system vio-
lates this right to the extent that it removes children from 
stable placements with potential adoptive parents who are fit 
parents but do not meet the screening criteria. 
C. THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT SCREENING SYSTEM ON FA-
MILIAL RIGHTS 
The rights of children to stable family relationships is 
undermined by a system which delays and denies adoptions 
based on factors having nothing to do with parental fit-
ness.134 The factual setting of In re Bridget R. demonstrates 
how one screening factor, race, can operate to deny children 
129. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 514, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
130. Id. at 524 (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 255) (emphasis added in 
Bridget R.). 
131. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
at 759-61, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 649, and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 
257). 
132. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524. 
133. Id. 
134. See infra notes 145-150 and accompanying text. 
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their right to stable family relationships. Other screening fac-
tors can have a similar effect. 135 
In Bridget R., the California Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond District considered the effects on these fundamental rights 
of children when the Indian Child Welfare Act is applied to 
Native American children adopted by non-Indian parents. 136 
Birth parents who were both partially of Native American 
descent consented to the adoption of their twin baby girls be-
cause they were unable to support them financially.137 Later 
the birth father attempted to withdraw his consent to the 
adoption. 138 His consent to the adoption was valid under Cali-
fornia Family Code Section 8700, but not under the ICWA.139 
The court held that the ICWA is only constitutional if limited 
to the "existing Indian family" doctrine. 14O The otherwise 
compelling governmental interest in preserving Native Ameri-
can culture141 is simply not served by blocking an adoption if 
the birth parents have no significant contacts with a tribe and 
its culture. 142 Thus, applying the ICWA to children like 
Bridget and Lucy, the twins in this case, whose parents have 
no significant contact with any Indian tribe, treats them differ-
135. See infra notes 226-227 and accompanying text. 
136. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is codified at 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-23 
and 1931-63. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519. It gives Indian tribes the juris-
diction and funding to handle most of the child custody cases involving children 
who are members of a tribe. [d. The ICWA provides that for a consent by the 
birth parents to the adoption of a Native American child to be valid, it must be: 
1) executed in writing, and 2) recorded in front of a judge 3) more than 10 days 
after the child is born. [d. at 515. The ICWA is unique in adoption law because it 
is based in part on a desire to preserve Native American culture and in part on 
the sovereignty of Indian tribes. [d. at 528. 
The requirements for birth parent consent to an adoption under California 
state law are less stringent. The California Family Code provides that the birth 
parent or parents may effectively consent to adoption "by a written statement 
signed before two subscribing witnesses and acknowledged by an authorized official 
of the department or agency." CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700(a) (West 1994). 
137. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517. 
138. [d. at 507. 
139. [d. at 515. 
140. [d. at 529. The "existing Indian family doctrine" limits application of the 
ICWA to cases where the child's birth parents are involved in a tribe and its 
culture and applies state adoption laws to children of Native American descent 
who would not have this kind of contact if raised by their assimilated birth par-
ents. [d. at 520. 
141. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526. 
142. [d. at 529. 
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ently from other children waiting to be adopted based only on 
their "genetic heritage - in other words, race. "143 This differ-
ence in treatment is in fewer available adoptive homes and a 
greater risk that their placement with adoptive families may 
be disrupted, as happened to Bridget and Lucy.l44 Such dif-
ferent treatment, based only on their race, violated both the 
twins' right to equal protection of the laws,145 and their due 
process interest in their relationship with their adoptive par-
ents. l46 
Like the twin girls in In re Bridget R., many minority 
children wait far longer for homes than white children do. 147 
This has two detrimental effects. Some children bounce around 
in foster care never finding a stable family.l46 Other children 
do find a stable foster family placement, only to have the bonds 
they form with such families severed when adoption agencies 
143. Id. at 527. 
144. Id. 
145. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529. 
Id. at 528. 
The ICWA requires Indian children who cannot be cared 
for by their natural parents to be treated differently from 
non-Indian children in the same situation. As a result of 
this disparate treatment, the number and variety of adop-
tive homes that are potentially available to an Indian 
child are more limited than those available to non-Indian 
children, and an Indian child who has been placed in an 
adoptive or potential adoptive home has a greater risk 
than do non-Indian children of being taken from that 
home and placed with strangers. 
146. Id. at 529. 
147. The average wait for all children in foster care to be adopted is two and 
one-half years, but for minority children the average wait is five years. Albert R. 
Hunt, Politics and People: Metzenbaum Breaches the Adoption Color Barrier, WALL 
ST. J., July 14, 1994, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. This is in spite of 
the fact that many parents seeking to adopt do not specify a racial preference for 
their child. Review and Outlook (Editorial): The Adoption Option, WALL ST. J., 
July 7, 1989, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. 
148. One study in Missouri showed that one third of the children in that state's 
foster care system had been in four or more foster homes in less than five years. 
Bryce J. Christensen, Two Cheers for Independent Adoption, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 
1987, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. See also the discussion of New 
York's foster care system in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality 
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 833-38 (1977), supra note 95. Approximately 60% of the 
children in foster care in New York City at that time had experienced more than 
one foster care placement. Approximately 28% of these children had been in three 
or more foster homes. Id. at 837. 
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choose instead to place them with strangers who are the same 
race as the children or who more nearly match the agency's 
profile of what an adoptive parent should look like in other 
ways.149 Preventing these detrimental effects is so essential 
to the well-being of children that the Bridget R. court held that 
parental screening procedures which contribute to these harms 
violate children's fundamental rights. 150 If, as the Bridget R. 
opinion indicates, children have a constitutional right to stabil-
ity and continuity of familial relationships, the current adop-
tion screening system violates that right. 151 Similarly, if po-
tential adoptive foster families have a constitutionally protect-
ed interest in maintaining their family bonds, as the plurality 
opinion in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families and the 
Supreme Court's analysis of parental rights in Quilloin v. 
Walcott indicate they do, the current screening system is un-
constitutionaL 152 
149. The emotional impact on children can be devastating. Bryce J. Christensen, 
Two Cheers for Independent Adoption, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1987, available in 
WESTLAW, WSJ Database. In In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1305 (Cal. 1994), 
for example, the child developed a psychological separation anxiety disorder when 
faced with the prospect of being separated from the foster parents who had raised 
her since she was a baby. In McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 327 (E.D. 
Pa. 1988), affd, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989), a child became severely depressed as 
a result of being separated from the family who had cared for him since he was 
an infant. 
150. In In re Bridget R., the court held that race-matching violated the twins' 
constitutional rights unless there was a compelling interest to justify it. See supra 
notes 140-146 and accompanying text. The court remanded the case to determine 
whether the twins' birth father did have significant contacts with a tribe which 
would further the compelling interest in preserving Native American culture. In re 
Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The appeals court in-
structed the trial court that even if it finds the birth father does have such con-
tacts, it must then determine whether returning the girls to their birth father is 
in their best interests. Id. at 533. The reach of the ICWA, even where its applica-
tion may promote a compelling interest in preserving Native American culture, "is 
limited by the twins' interest in having a stable and secure home." Id. The ap-
peals court considered the twins' interests in stability and continuity at least as 
compelling as any interest that might support race-matching, if not more so. The 
court stated, "we believe it would constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to remove a child from a stable place-
ment . . . without a hearing to determine whether the child would suffer harm if 
removed from that placement." Id. 
151. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra notes 91-115 and accompanying text. 
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V. THE SCREENING OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS USING 
DISCRIMINATORY CRITERIA 
The primary problem with the screening process is that it 
does not simply ensure the adoptive parents' basic fitness as 
parents, but instead imposes arbitrary standards that fail to 
protect the child. 153 For example, agencies screen potential 
adoptive parents on the basis of race, religion, age, marital 
status,l54 and even place of residence. 155 The screening sys-
tem tries to emulate the biological family through racial 
matching and a preference for married couples in their twen-
ties or early thirties. 156 These criteria fail to serve the best 
interests of the children they are intended to protect, and in 
fact harm those children by delaying adoptions and removing 
them from stable families. 157 Recent changes in the laws gov-
erning screening of parents on the basis of race may point the 
way to a better way of screening in all areas. 158 
Part A will discuss the screening system as an attempt to 
duplicate the physical appearance of biological families in 
adoption. Part B will discuss and reject the reasons for screen-
ing on the basis of race. One reason for race-matching is past 
segregation.159 Other reasons are mistaken assumptions that 
only same-race parents can give minority children a positive 
153. McDermott, supra note 70, at 147. See also, BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, 
supra note 4, at 70, noting "the absence of any evidence that screening succeeds 
in identifying superior parents." Accord, Hollinger, supra note 3, at 48. 
154. Such distinctions in any other area of the law would be impermissible 
discrimination. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 72. See supra note 6. 
155. McDermott, supra note 70, at 147. 
156. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 72. "Older parents are often 
precluded from adopting children more than thirty-five or forty years younger than 
themselves on the ground that they would not have been likely to produce such 
children themselves." [d. 
157. The disparate impact this has on minority children was discussed supra 
part IV.B., Children's Right to a Stable Home, as was the devastating impact the 
instability can have on individual children. Examples of the emotional damage to 
children cause by race-based removals from foster parents or other care-givers can 
be found in the cases discussed throughout this comment. For this reason, Part V 
will not deal with the harms of the screening system in detail, but will instead 
focus on the flaws in the reasoning which supports the system. 
158. See infra Part VI, Recent Reforms. 
159. See infra notes 176-185 and accompanying text. 
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image of themselves and their race, and teach them how to 
cope with the racism they will encounter in society.16o Part B 
will then explore the unique problems faced by multiracial 
children in the adoption placement context and by mixed-race 
couples seeking to adopt. Part C will examine at screening on 
the basis of age, marital status, and other discriminatory fac-
tors. 
A. SCREENING TO EMULATE THE BIOLOGICAL FAMILY 
The screening system is, in many ways, little more than 
an attempt to make the adoptive family physically resemble 
the biological family.161 Until the late 1950's, adoption agen-
cies matched parents with children who were physically and 
intellectually "as close a match as possible to the biological 
children they might have produced. "162 The ideal was for 
adopted children to look enough like their adoptive parents 
that no one would realize they were adopted. 163 These prac-
tices were based on a belief that physical similarities would 
allow the child to bond more easily with her adoptive fami-
ly.lM The reality of bonding within families that look quite 
unlike biological families proves this old assumption 
wrong. 165 
Nevertheless, the goal of physically replicating the biologi-
cal family continues to influence the screening system, particu-
160. See infra notes 188-212 and accompanying text. 
161. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1173, stating 
that the "implicit goal has been to create an adoptive family which will resemble 
as much as possible 'the real thing' - the 'natural' or biological family that it is 
not." 
162. Id. at 1176. 
163. BURGESS, supra note 80, at 14. During this period, the prevailing notion 
was that the children themselves should not know they were adopted. In re Adop-
tion of Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 871 (Wis. 1973). 
164. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1176. 
165. See, e.g., Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 
1171, where Bartholet, the single adoptive mother of two Peruvian Indian children, 
says of her older son, "This child is as inside my skin as any child could be." See 
also, Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Services, 563 
F.2d 1200 5th Cir. 1977), and McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 
1988), where interracial foster families shared parent-child bonds; and In re M.D., 
Jr., 653 A.2d 873 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995), where a single foster mother shared par-
ent-child bonds with the foster son she sought to adopt. 
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larly through the use of screening factors such as the race and 
age of adopting parents. l66 The National Association of Black 
Social Workers, in its position paper against interracial adop-
tion, considered the physical differences between an Mrican-
American adopted child and his family a crucial deterrent to 
the child's sense of identity.167 Where multiracial children are 
placed for adoption, social workers typically choose the race of 
the family with which they will place such a child based on the 
child's appearance. l68 Similarly, in cases where the adopting 
parents' age is a factor, courts explicitly compare the age of the 
adopting parents to the age of typical biological parents. 169 
Such factors have nothing to do with parenting ability; the 
myth that adoptive families cannot form bonds unless they 
look like biological families is simply not true. Children form 
deep emotional bonds based on their parents' efforts to satisfy 
their physical needs and their needs for attention and affec-
tion. 170 Parents need not look like biological parents to fulfill 
this function in their child's life.l7l 
B. SCREENING ON THE BASIS OF RACE 
Until recently, all states allowed racial matching; some 
states even required it.172 In California, a child could only be 
166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
167. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 956 (citing NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF 
BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (1973». "There is no 
chance of his resembling any relative. One's physical identity . . . is significant." 
Id. 
168. See Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 553 (citing Ellen Hopkins, The Color 
Line, in MIRABELLA, May, 1990), noting that social workers decide which race to 
label a multiracial child based on the child's skin tone and other physical charac-
teristics. If the child looks multiracial, the social workers will most likely label her 
as her minority race. Id. See infra Section VI.B.1. for a discussion of the racist 
origins of this method of labelling. See also Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of 
Family and Children's Services, 563 F.2d 1200, 1204 (5th Cir. 1977), where the 
petition of white foster parents to adopt their biracial foster child (whose birth 
mother was white) was denied because "agency employees were also aware that as 
Timmy grew he would retain the characteristics of his black father." 
169. See, e.g., In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Wis. 1973) ("larger age dif-
ference than the normal age difference between the natural parents and their chil-
dren"); and Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850-CV-W-6, 1992 WL 396318, *2 (W.D. Mo. 
Dec. 28, 1992) ("age . . . similar to. that of a biological grandparent"). 
170. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 40, at 17. 
171. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
172. Hollinger, supra note 3, at 48. 
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placed in an interracial family after the agency showed that it 
had made a "diligent search" for a family the same race as the 
child, but that after ninety days (three months) that search 
proved futile. 173 This preference for racially homogenous fam-
ilies often resulted in separating the child from a foster parent 
or parents who had successfully raised that child for more than 
a year. 174 In recent years, however, many states have amend-
ed their laws to eliminate racial matching altogether or to 
prohibit agencies from categorically denying adoptions based 
on the race of the parents or child.175 
1. The Segregationist Origin of Race-Matching 
At one time, this society was predominantly racially segre-
gated.176 When the United States Supreme Court decided in 
1967 that laws banning interracial marriages were unconstitu-
tional,177 sixteen states still had such laws on their books. 178 
This desire to keep families segregated has had two major 
effects on the adoption race-matching scheme. One effect is a 
belief that integrated families are simply not "natural," and 
thus not in children's best interests. 179 For example, in ruling 
that it was appropriate to remove a multiracial child from his 
white foster parents, one court said that "it is a natural thing 
for children to be raised by parents of their own ethnic back-
ground. 180 An earlier and more blatantly racist example of 
the use of race in child placement decisions was Ward v. Ward, 
in which the Washington Supreme Court upheld a trial court 
173. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(b) & (c) (West 1994). The "diligent search" was to 
include appeals in the media for same race parents. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710 (West 
1994). These sections were repealed in 1995. A.B. 1743, Cal. Leg., 1995-1996 Sess. 
(1995). 
174. See, e.g, Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Ser-
vices, 563 F. Supp. 1200 (5th Cir. 1977); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 
318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989); Child v. Stangler, 1992 WL 
396318 (W.D. Mo. 1992). See generally Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? 
supra note 6, at 1191-93. 
175. See infra note 246. 
176. See supra note 63. 
177. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
178. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 536, n: 34. 
179. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1241. 
180. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Services, 563 
F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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order awarding custody of the daughters of a divorcing black 
father and white mother to their father because it was best if 
the girls stayed "among their own people."181 
Ward also illustrated the other impact of segregation on 
the adoption screening system: the practice of defining the 
children of interracial unions as black and only black.182 In 
fact, children with any trace of African ancestry are considered 
black, and must wait for a "same-race" family to adopt them 
even if white or interracial couples are available immediate-
ly.l83 These children are classified in this manner because of 
an old racist notion that even "one drop" of non-white blood 
"contaminates" a multiracial person's "pure" white blood so 
that the person cannot possibly be labelled white. l84 While 
the agency waits to find a "same-race" home, the child may be 
bounced around from one foster home to another.185 These old 
181. Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 756 (Wash. 1950). The court considered the 
girls, who were both black and white, to be only black. This custody dispute be-
tween biological parents is relevant as an illustration of the way race plays an 
often illogical role in decisions that are supposed to be based on the individual 
child's best interests. . 
182. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1175 and n. 
14. The same method decides how adoption agencies will label multiracial children 
who are partially white and partially Asian or Hispanic. 
183. [d. See, e.g., Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972), in 
which an interracial couple seeking to adopt and a white couple who wished to 
adopt a black child successfully challenged Louisiana's absolute prohibition on 
interracial adoption. The interracial couple, the Normans, could not adopt any 
child since the law provided that "A single person over the age of twenty-one 
years, or a married couple jointly, may petition to adopt a child of his or their 
race." [d. The adoption agency told them that as an interracial couple they simply 
could not adopt. [d. at 265. 
184. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 538 (citing Neil Gotanda, A Critique of 
"Our Constitution is Color-Blind, n 44 STAN. L. REv. I, 34 (1991)). The extreme 
distastefulness of this form of racism is one of the reasons that the author propos-
es to remove such a notion from the adoption screening process. 
185. See supra note 148. Even if the four or five foster families all provide 
excellent care, this means repeatedly forming bonds only to have them tom apart 
by the next transfer. As a result, children who are not placed early for adoption 
have difficulty ever forming permanent family bonds. Studies show that early 
permanent placement is the most important factor in the healthy emotional devel-
opment of adopted children. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra 
note 6, at 1224 (citing W. FEIGELMAN & A. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN: NEW 
PATTERNS OF ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 93 (1983». This study specifically compared 
the effects of interracial adoptions with the effects of delaying placement and 
found the latter to be more harmful. Multiracial children face the additional prob-
lems of classification, which will be discussed in part BA. 
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notions of racially homogenized families harm minority and 
multiracial children who need permanent homes as soon as 
possible. 
Were remnants of segregationist institutions the only 
reason the restrictive race-matching scheme is still in place, it 
would be far easier to reject this system. Adoption profession-
als, however, express concerns over the ability of white parents 
to meet the needs of minority and multiracial children. 186 
These needs include the child's sense of racial identity and 
self-esteem and the ability to cope with racism, including nega-
tive reactions to the child's interracial family.187 
2. The Child's Racial Identity and Self-Esteem 
One reason for the opposition to interracial adoption is a 
concern that minority children raised in white or mixed-race 
homes will lose their cultural identity.188 Studies show, how-
ever, that most adopted children in interracial families have a 
sense of identity and cultural heritage. 189 The strength of this 
sense of identity depends on the adoptive parents' efforts to 
foster it.190 Such efforts might include buying books, toys, and 
records that teach about the child's ethnic culture, and spend-
ing time with other people of the child's background or back-
grounds. 191 Living in an integrated neighborhood and making 
186. Arguments in favor of race-matching lose whatever force they otherwise 
might have when one considers the unwillingness of agencies to place multiracial 
children with parents of one of that child's races or any multiracial or minority 
children with interracial couples. See infra part N.B.4. for some outrageous results 
of race-matching in action in this context. 
187. See infra notes 188-212 and accompanying text. 
188. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 926 (citing NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF 
BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (1973)). "Black chil-
dren in white homes are cut off from the healthy development of themselves as 
black people .... " Id. 
189. Silverman, supra -note 62, at 104. One study, by the Institute of Mental 
Health, found that teenagers who had been adopted as young children were just 
as mentally healthy as teenagers who had been raised by their biological parents, 
and that interracially-adopted teens were equally well-adjusted, and had a strong 
sense of racial identity. Albert R. Hunt, Politics and People: Metzenbaum Breaches 
the Adoption Color Barrier, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 
WSJ Database. 
190. Silverman, supra note 62, at 104. Accord Bartholet, Where Do Black Chil-
dren Belong? supra note 6, at 1220. 
191. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 948, n. 141 (citing Margaret Howard, 
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sure the child attends a racially-diverse school also help to give 
the child a sense of racial identity.192 Studies show that sev-
enty-five percent of interracially adopted children adjust well 
in their adoptive families and have the same levels of self-
esteem as other children.193 For about half of the children 
who do not do well in interracial adoptions, factors other than 
the mixed-race family are to blame, such as delays in perma-
nent placement or traumatic experiences early in life. 194 
The only significant difference between interracial and 
same-race adoptions is a difference in how the children per-
ceive themselves racially as they grow Up.195 Most minority 
children adopted by white families identify with both the white 
community and the minority community.196 As a result, many 
black children adopted by white parents197 see themselves as 
white, mixed-race, or simply "human.,,198 Only thirty percent 
identified themselves as black. l99 One analysis of interracial 
adoptions distinguished between two aspects of racial identity: 
having a positive image of one's race, and strongly identifying 
with its cultural heritage and no other cultures.2oo The for-
mer, but not the latter, is crucial to the child's self-esteem.201 
While interracially adopted black children tend to identify less 
Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 503, 539 (1984)). 
192. Silvennan, supra note 62, at 110, noting that children in interracial adop-
tive families who live in integrated neighborhoods and attend racially integrated 
schools and churches have a stronger sense of racial identity than those who do 
not. 
193. Id. at 109-110. 
194. Id. at 108. One study found age at the time of placement in the adoptive 
family to be the most crucial factor in the success of interracial adoptions. Id. at 
115. Accord Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1224. 
195. Silvennan, supra note 62, at 110. 
196. Id. at 117. 
197. Interracial adoptions involve white and interracially married parents almost 
exclusively. One study found only four placements of white children with black 
parents. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1175, n.12 
(citing DAWN DAY, THE ADOPTION OF BLACK CHILDREN: COUNTERACTING INSTITU-
TIONAL DISCRIMINATION (1979)). 
198. Silvennan, supra note 62, at 110. 
199. Id. It should be noted that the majority of "interracially" adopted children 
in fact are biracial or multiracial children with one white birth parent who are 
adopted by white parents. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 
6, at 1175, n.14. 
200. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 947. 
201. Id. 
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strongly with their race and no other than do black children 
adopted by black parents, their image of their ''blackness'' is 
just as positive.202 Parents' attitudes towards their child's ra-
cial heritage and identity have a strong impact on how the 
child sees herself, regardless of the color of the parents' 
skin.203 
Living in a multiracial family can provide unique advan-
tages such as a sense of belonging in more than one culture, 
and more tolerance towards differences than might be gained 
growing up in a racially homogenous family.204 The 
interracially-adopted child may enjoy the richness of more than 
one culture, just as many interracially adopting parents take 
joy in learning about and participating in their children's cul-
tural heritage.205 Given the different levels of success among 
parents of all races in instilling in their children a positive 
racial identity, it simply makes more sense to assess all par-
ents, regardless of race, based on their individual willingness 
and ability to do SO.206 
202. [d. Although the article focused on the problems of black and biracial 
(black/white) children in the adoption system, there is no reason to assume the 
results would be different in any other interracial adoptions. 
203. Silverman, supra note 62, at 108, noting that for the small number of 
interracially adopted children who do have identity problems, the failure of their 
parents to acknowledge their racial background was a factor in causing their con-
fusion. 
204. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1221-1222. 
Bal,1;holet refers to an informal study conducted by Dr. Alvin Poussaint. [d. at 
1221, n.158. Dr. Poussaint, hoping to disprove the once-prevailing attitude that 
interracial marriages had a negative impact on the children of such marriages, 
interviewed adult children of one white and one black parent. [d. He asked about 
what they perceived to be the advantages and disadvantages of growing up in an 
interracial family. [d. They usually emphasized the positive aspects. [d. They saw 
being a part of two cultures as an advantage, and said that they felt less intimi-
dated by racism than other black or biracial people who had not grown up with 
parents of both races. [d. They claimed that they stood out as different in social 
situations in ways that were both positive and negative. [d. Bartholet did not cite 
to a published study; she received this information in a telephone interview with 
Dr. Poussaint. [d. at n. 158 
205. See, e.g., Joan Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll: Transracial Adoption and 
Cultural Preservation, 59 U.M.KC. L. REV. 487, 500 (1991). After discussing her 
plans to give her multiracial baby daughter a sense of the baby's black cultural 
heritage, Mahoney states that the whole family will benefit from these cultural 
experiences as much as the baby will. 
206. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1220, noting 
that not all minority parents successfully foster a sense of racial" identity in their 
children. See also Mahoney, supra note 205, at 498, noting that many black fami-
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3. The Child's Ability to Cope with Racism 
Proponents of race-matching further contend that only 
minority parents can teach minority children the skills they 
need to cope with the racism they are likely to encounter some-
time during their lives.207 This argument initially seems to 
make sense, since minority adoptive parents have experienced 
racism themselves while white adoptive parents have not. For 
the reasons that follow, however, white parents should be able 
to give their minority and multiracial children the skills they 
need to overcome racism. 
For one thing, the argument that only racial minorities 
have experienced any form of prejudice simply is not true. 
White parents are themselves members of various ethnic 
groups. One does not have to think too hard to recall ethnic 
slurs and stereotypes for each of the European immigrant 
groups that make up the white "majority." Although this sort 
of prejudice hardly compares to the institutionalized discrimi-
nation encountered by many racial minorities,208 encounter-
ing it can be no less hurtful than the kind of racist attitudes 
minority children are likely to encounter nowadays.209 Fur-
thermore, as members of mixed-race families, white adoptive 
parents may themselves become the objects of racial prejudice, 
and must learn how to cope along with their children.210 
lies live in predominantly white neighborhoods and send their children to nearly 
all-white schools. In McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. 1988), 
the court heard evidence that many black couples were not able to provide ade-
quate foster care to black children. In In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1996), the appellate court directed the trial court to consider on remand 
whether the children's birth father would instill in them a sense of Native Ameri-
can culture and identity. See supra note 150. 
207. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 926 (citing NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF 
BLACK SOCIAL WORKERS, POSITION ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (1973». "Black chil-
dren are taught, from a very early age, highly sophisticated coping techniques to 
deal with racist practices . . . Only a Black family can transmit the emotional and 
sensitive subtleties of perception and reaction essential for a Black child's survival 
in a racist society." Id. 
208. Simple insults pale in comparison to the slavery and segregation endured 
by African-Americans or the internment camps endured by Japanese Americans. 
209. One writer suggests that white parents in interracial families teach their 
children to cope with racial insults with the techniques they themselves learned to 
use to cope with any other insults, ethnically or racially motivated or not. Forde-
Mazrui, supra note 67, at 954. 
210. Id. See also Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 
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Most importantly, white parents are as able as any other 
parents to give their children a positive sense of themselves 
racially and individually.211 This ability, coupled with their 
own condemnation of racist views, is one of the strongest tools 
for fighting racism parents can impart to their children.212 
4. The Unique Problems of Multiracial Children and Interra-
cial Couples 
The policy of race-matching makes even less sense now, 
when multiracial children make up a significant percentage of 
the children waiting for adoptive families, and interracial mar-
riages are becoming more and more common.213 The screen-
ing system ignores this reality.214 For multiracial children, 
the common practice of classifying them (and waiting families) 
1170-71. Bartholet discusses her heightened understanding of racism after adopting 
a brown-skinned Peruvian Indian baby boy. "I listen with new ears to a familiar 
discussion of affirmative action . . . I . . . learn something of the problems that 
children of color face as they advance into the older grades at the local school 
that my biological child had attended." [d. 
211. See supra notes 188-206 and accompanying text. 
212. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 954-955. 
213. Minority children make up 46% of the children in foster care waiting for 
adoptive homes. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 552, n.111. Of these children, 
many are in fact multiracial children classified as only one of their races. Statis-
tics show that children born to parents of different races increased from 1% of the 
total number of babies born in 1968 to 3.4% of the total in 1989. [d. at 531, n. 4. 
These statistics probably underestimate the true number since the parents them-
selves tend to be classified as only one race, for example on census surveys. [d. 
(citing to statistics of the Population Reference Bureau). In fact, the majority of 
people classified as African-American, Latino, Filipino, and Native American are 
really multiracial, as are a significant, though smaller, percentage of people identi-
fied as white. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 544 (citing Maria P.P. Root, With-
in, Between, and Beyond Race, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 3, 9 (Maria 
P.P. Root ed., 1992». 
In 1991, there were over 200,000 black/white interracially-married couples in 
the United States. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 536-537 (citing Lynell 
Beorge, Cross Colors, L.A. TIMES, March 27, 1994). There are no accurate statistics 
that show how many of these couples seek to adopt. Bartholet, Where Do Black 
Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1166, n. 4. The documented cases of those who 
try to adopt demonstrate the difficulties they face in an adoption system which 
favors racially-homogenous families. See, e.g., Compos v. McKeithen 341 F. Supp. 
264 (E.D. La. 1972), supra note 183. 
214. Agencies typically classify children as members of one and only one race. 
See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text. They use the same method for 
classifying potential adoptive families. See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying 
text. 
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as one race and only one race leads to further difficulties in 
finding a match.215 Furthermore, this failure to take into ac-
count their complete racial heritage denies them the benefits of 
cultural preservation and racial identity that proponents say 
justify the race-matching system.216 
The logical inconsistency of classifying multiracial children 
as belonging to a single race and trying to match them with a 
family of that race is demonstrated by the following hypotheti-
cal suggested by one writer on the placement of multiracial 
children: 
Where should the child of an Asian woman and 
a Latino man be placed? Can she go to either a 
Latino family or an Asian family because she 
shares [racial characteristics] with both? Can 
she go to any multiracial family because she is 
multiracial? Or can she find no home unless a 
family with her exact racial lineage is locat-
ed?217 
Such a child most likely would be labelled either as Latino or 
Asian and would wait for a home until the agency finds a ra-
cially homogenous family of whichever race the adoption work-
ers choose for the child.218 What this child really needs, of 
course, is a family that will love and nurture her as soon as 
possible, a need which is jeopardized by the existing adoption 
system. 
Making race-based placement decisions becomes even more 
complicated when adoption agencies classify multiracial fami-
lies the same way they classify children: by choosing one and 
only one race. For example, a brown-skinned child whose birth 
mother is white and whose birth father is unknown was classi-
fied as black, while his foster family, a white mother and Mri-
can-American father, were classified as white.219 Consequent-
215. This unrealistic classification approach adds to the placement delays minor-
ity children endure. See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text. 
216. See infra notes 222-225 and accompanying text. 
217. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 532. 
218. See infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text. 
219. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 555 (citing Thorwald Esbeusen, Children 
Need Homes, Not Ethnic Politics, in CRISIS, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 21). 
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ly, the child was "a candidate for removal" from his foster 
home in favor of a "same-race" placement.22o An Mrican-
American woman and her white husband were surprised to 
discover that an adoption agency would give them "very low 
priority" to adopt a multiracial child because, according to the 
agency, they were not a close enough racial match to such a 
child.221 It is difficult to imagine a closer racial match to a 
multiracial child than an interracial couple representing two of 
the child's races. This demonstrates the logical inconsistency of 
applying single-race labels to children and families who are of 
many races and trying to match them based on inaccurate 
labels. 
Another problem with applying single-race labels to multi-
racial children and families in race-matching is that it ham-
pers the multiracial child's ability to develop a sense of his 
true and complete racial identity.222 A biracial child, for ex-
ample, who identifies himself as both black and white does so 
because he is both.223 Forcing a single-race label upon a child 
who is in fact multiracial can actually cause the child to suffer 
low self-esteem because the single-race label only represents 
half of who the child is.224 If cultural preservation is in the 
child's best interests, then preserving both or all a multiracial 
child's cultural heritages is in that child's best interests.225 
After all, such a child really is a member of more than one 
race. 
c. SCREENING ON THE BASIS OF AGE, MARITAL STATUS, AND 
OTHER DISCRIMINATORY FACTORS 
Race-matching, while the primary factor responsible for 
delaying adoptions and undermining the stable placements of 
220. Id. 
221. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1187, n. 60. 
222. See generally, Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68. 
223. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 69, at 956 (citing Philip M. Brown, Biracial Iden-
tity and Social Marginality, in 7 CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SOCIAL WORK 319, 325 
(1990». 
224. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 555, n.127 (citing PAUL R. SPICKARD, 
MIXED BLOOD: INTERMARRIAGE AND ETHNIC IDENTITY IN TwENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 339 (1989». Accord, Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 956-57. 
225. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 67, at 956. 
36
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss2/3
1997] ADOPTION SCREENING PROCESS 203 
children in potential adoptive families, is not the only factor 
having that effect. For example, available same-race parents 
may be denied the opportunity to adopt a waiting child be-
cause they are single.226 Screening factors, such as marital 
status and age, like race, do little to predict the adoptive 
parent's ability to raise a child.227Yet adoption agencies regu-
larly apply these factors as they strive for a preconceived im-
age of what a family should be.228 In doing so, the agencies 
actually deprive many children of early placement in good 
homes. 
Although it is common for children to be raised by only 
one biological parent, "'as late as 1969 a respected adoption 
expert found it necessary to defend single parent adoption as 
'not inherently or necessarily pathogenic.',,229 Most single 
adoptive parents are women,230 although single men adopt 
children as well. 231 These parents are more willing than most 
adoptive parents to adopt older children, who are harder to 
place than babies.232 Their marital status has little if any im-
pact on the successful development of their adopted chil-
226. One little boy in Philadelphia waited six years for a permanent home 
while the agency responsible for placing him rejected first two potential adoptive 
parents who were single and then several couples who were not the same race as 
the child. After six· years, the agency took him ofT its list of children available for 
adoption because he was unable to bond with a permanent family after years of 
moving from foster home to foster home. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 68, at 553-54 
(citing William Raspberry, Hurdles Slow Adoption of Black Children, TIMES-HER-
ALD RECORD, December 29, 1990, at 36). 
227. Although this comment focuses on race, age, and marital status as 'paren-
tal screening factors, these are by no means the only discriminatory factors used 
to prevent fit parents from adopting. See, e.g., In re B.L.S., 901 S.W.2d 38 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 1995), supra note 82 (income and marital status were factors in denial of 
adoption), and In re Carney, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (father's 
physical disability was an important factor in trial court awarding custody to the 
mother). 
228. See supra notes 161-171 and accompanying text. 
229. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 7l. 
230. Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, in 3 THE 
FuTuRE OF CHILDREN 26, 37 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D., ed., 1993). 
231. BURGESS, supra note 80, at 125. 
232. Stolley, supra note 230, at 37. "Older" hard-to-place children are those over 
two years old. BURGESS, supra note 80, at 125. It should be noted, however, that 
one reason single parents are so open to adopting older children is that because 
agencies prefer married couples, single parents realize that babies will go to mar-
ried adoptive parents first. Id. 
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dren.233 The single adoptive parent's extended family is very 
important for the adopted child, for "it is there that the child 
will find his surrogate father or mother."234 Agencies placing 
children with single parents can and do consider the single 
adoptive parent's extended family relationships to decide 
whether placing a child in a particular family is in the child's 
best interest.235 
Adoption agencies prefer parents in their twenties or early 
thirties, in part because this is the age at which they believe 
most biological parents are likely to have children.236 In In re 
Adoption of Tachick, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered 
the argument that the adoption of a three-year-old child by his 
biological grandparents was not in his best interests because of 
their age.237 Mrs. Shehow, the child's grandmother, was fifty-
three years old and Mr. Shehow, the grandfather, was fifty-
nine years old.238 Both had possible health problems.239 The 
county agency opposing the adoption argued that, due to their 
age, the Shehows would be likely to die while the little boy 
was still young, which would be traumatic for him.240 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court considered this argument unpersua-
sive, pointing out, "we have no assurance that if the child were 
to be adopted by younger people that they would live to a ripe 
old age."241 
Furthermore, concerns over the longevity of "older" par-
233. Stolley, supra note 230, at 37. 
234. BURGESS, supra note 80, at 125. 
235. Id. 
236. See supra note 156 and accompanying text and note 169 and accompanying 
text. 
237. In re Tachick 210 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Wis. 1973). Other issues in the case. 
included the fact that only one of the grandparents' eight biological children had 
fInished high school, a concern that the birth father of the child would become the 
child's legal brother if the grandparents were allowed to adopt, and concerns over 
the grandparents' health. Id. at 869, 870. 
238. Id. at 869-870. 
239. Id. Doctors suspected Mrs. Shehow suffered from high blood pressure and 
that Mr. Shehow was diabetic, but they had not yet been diagnosed as such at 
the time of trial. Id. 
240. Id. at 871. The Shehows would be ages 74 and 68 when the child reached 
the age of 18. One might question whether, in the absence of their possible health 
problems, there would be any justillcation for the agency's concern about their 
longevity. 
241. Id. 
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ents make even less sense in the context of adoptive parents in 
their late thirties or early forties, who also rank lower in the 
adoption screening system.242 Ironically, the added maturity 
and the financial and emotional security of these "older" par-
ents are the very characteristics that give them the ability to 
provide for their children and to develop an exceptionally good 
relationship with them. 243 
The use of discriminatory factors in the screening of adop-
tive parents does little to advance the best interests of chil-
dren. Such factors do not tell adoption agencies or courts 
much, if anything, about the individual parent's ability to raise 
a child.244 More importantly, the use' of these factors often 
causes delays in permanent placement, particularly for minori-
ty children, or results in separating children from prospective 
adoptive parents who are already raising them.245 The only 
way to adequately protect children's best interests is to com-
pletely eliminate these screening factors and focus instead on 
the individual parents' ability to nurture and support the child. 
VI. RECENT REFORMS 
Recent reforms in some states address these problems, but 
do not go far enough. For example, reforms in many states 
make interracial adoptions easier.246 These reforms are bene-
242. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 70. 
243. Paul R. Ackennan, Creating a Family: The Adoption Option, in IB CUR-
RENT PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES: CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES: CREATION AND CONFLICT 81, 85 (Sandra Anderson Garcia and Robert 
Batey eds., 1991). 
244. See supra parts V.B.2. and V.B.3., for a discussion of the failure of race as 
a factor to predict parental ability, for example. 
245. See supra notes 147-149 and note 174 and accompanying text. 
246. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105.01(A) (West Supp. 1996) (enacted 
1995) (an adoption agency or court "shall not deny or delay a placement or an 
adoption certification based on the race, the color, or the national origin of the 
adoptive parent or child"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1129 (West Supp. 1997), 
(amended 1995) (adoption may not be denied solely because the parents and child 
do not share the same race or national origin); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957 
(West Supp. 1996), (enacted 1994), prohibits discrimination against prospective 
adoptive parents on the basis of race, age, religion, disability or income level. 
Minnesota still has a preferences-in-adoptive-placement scheme similar to the one 
California recently abandoned (relatives are considered first, then same-race fami-
lies, then other families), but MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (West Supp. 1997) 
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ticial in that they may shorten the waiting period for minority 
children awaiting adoptions.247 Thus the laws serve to ad-
vance the ''best interests of the child" and protect the possible 
constitutional familial rights of children waiting to be adopted. 
The reforms, however, with few exceptions, do not address 
discriminatory screening factors other than race, nor do they 
completely eliminate any of these factors from consider-
ation.248 The unfortunate effect is to leave open the possi-
bility that adoptions will continue to be delayed and denied 
based primarily, if not entirely, on factors that have nothing to 
do with parenting ability.249 
This section examines recent reforms in California,250 
Michigan,251 and Maine.252 The new laws in Maine and 
California prohibit discrimination against prospective adoptive 
parents on the basis of race and national origin, and also re-
quire that courts and adoption agencies take into account any 
emotional bonds the child has formed with a foster family in 
making placement decisions.253 The new Michigan statute 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, income level, 
(amended 1993) was amended to require "due, not sole, consideration" be given to 
a child's race in choosing an adoptive home. The words "not sole" were added. [d. 
California now prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in 
adoptions. See, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8708-8710 (West Supp. 1996) (enacted 1995). 
247. California repealed its mandatory waiting period of three months before 
adoption agencies could even consider available non-same-race families. See infra 
note 256. The adoption refonn statutes in many states prohibit delaying adoptions 
on the basis of race. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105.01(A) (West Supp. 
1996), supra note 246; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.045 (West Supp. 1997) 
(adoption shall not be delayed or denied on the basis of race). Maine law directly 
recognizes the importance of providing "the adoptee a pennanent home at the 
earliest possible date" in meeting the standard of the child's best interests. ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(2) (West Supp. 1997). 
248. See infra notes 261-275 and accompanying text and notes 290-294 and 
accompanying text. 
249. See infra note 268 and accompanying text. 
250. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8708, 8709, & 8710 (West Supp. 1996). 
251. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957 (West Supp. 1996). 
252. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(1) & (2) (West Supp. 1997). 
253. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(1)(E) & (F), and § 1129(2), CAL. FAM. 
CODE §§ 8708, 8790, and 8710 (West Supp. 1996). The Maine statute, while not 
expressly mentioning foster parents, mandates consideration of the child's bonds 
with various adults in her life in deciding whether the adoption is in the "best 
interests of the child." The California law requires that foster parents be consid-
ered along with other prospective adoptive parents in certain circumstances. 
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and age, as well as race.2M This section concludes that while 
these reforms are an improvement over a scheme which re-
quires preferences for same-race families, they leave open the 
possibility that race and other discriminatory factors will still 
be used to deny and delay adoptions. 
A. CALIFORNIA: AsSESSING THE INDIVIDUAL PARENT'S ABILITY 
TO MEET THE CHILD'S NEEDS AND CONSIDERING EXISTING P AR-
ENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Assessing the Individual Parent's Ability to Meet the 
Needs of a Child for Cultural Identity 
California made a dramatic change in the Family Code in 
1995.255 Prior to this amendment, California Family Code 
Section 8708 required that a diligent effort be made to place 
the child with either a relative or with adoptive parents the 
same race as the child before an interracial family could even 
be considered.256 The new California Family Code Section 
254. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957 (West Supp. 1996). 
255. A.B. 1743, Cal. Leg., 1995-1996 Sess. (1995). 
256. Prior to the refonns, CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (West 1994) (repealed 1995) 
provided in part: 
[Tlhe following order of placement preferences . . . shall 
be used . . . in determining the placement of the child: 
(a) In the home of a relative. 
(b) If a relative is not available, or if placement with a 
relative is not in the child's best interest, with an adop-
tive family with the same racial background or ethnic 
identification as the child. If the child is of mixed racial 
or ethnic background, placement shall be made with a 
family of the racial or ethnic group with which the child 
has the more significant contacts. 
(c) If placement cannot be made under the rules set forth 
in this section within 90 days of the time the child is 
relinquished for adoption . . . the child is free for adop-
tion with a family of a different racial background or 
ethnic identification where there is evidence of sensitivity 
to the child's race, ethnicity, and culture. The child's 
religious background shall also be considered in determin-
ing an appropriate placement. Unless it can be document-
ed that a diligent search . . . for a family meeting the 
placement criteria has been made, a child may not be 
placed for adoption with a family of a different racial 
background or ethnic identification pursuant to this subdi-
vision. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
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8708 forbids discrimination against either adoptive parents or 
children on the basis of race or national origin.257 Family 
Code Section 8709, enacted with the new Section 8708, pro-
vides that courts may consider the child's race and religion and 
the adopting parents' ability to "meet the needs of a child of 
this background" in determining whether the adoption is in the 
child's best interest. 258 The statute does not say whether 
courts should, or even may, consider the race of the adoptive 
parents in determining their capacity to meet the child's cul-
tural needs.259 
The "diligent search" was to be carefully documented and include efforts to 
recruit same-race families in the media. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710 (West 1994) (re-
pealed 1995). Section 8709 did, however, allow adoption agencies to place a child 
without following the placement preference scheme of Section 8708 if they could 
show "good cause" to do so. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (West 1994) (repealed 1995). 
[d. 
257. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (West Supp. 1996) provides: 
Neither the department nor a licensed adoption agency to 
which a child has been freed for adoption by either relin-
quishment or termination of parental rights may do either 
of the following: 
(a) Categorically deny to any person the opportunity to 
become an adoptive parent, solely on the basis of the 
race, color, or national origin of the adoptive parent or 
child involved. 
(b) Delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption, 
or otherwise discriminate in making an adoption place-
ment decision, solely on the basis of the race, color, or 
national origin of the adoptive parent or child involved. 
258. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
259. [d. Maine has a similar statute which, like the California statute, does not 
tell whether courts and agencies may consider the parents' race as well as the 
child's. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(2) provides in part: 
In determining the best interests of the adoptee, the court 
shall consider and evaluate the following factors to give 
the adoptee a permanent home at the earliest possible 
date: 
*** (B) The capacity and disposition of the adopting per-
son or persons, the birth parent or birth parents or the 
putative father to educate and give the adoptee love, 
affection, and guidance and to meet the needs of the 
adoptee, taking into account the adoptee's cultural, ethnic, 
or racial background. An adoption may not be delayed or 
denied solely because the adoptive parent and the child 
do not share the same race, color, or national origin. 
[d. The last sentence was added in 1995. [d. 
Because these laws are so new, there are no appellate cases yet that inter-
pret the statute's mandate to consider the parents' ability to meet the child's cul-
tural needs. See infra part VII. B. , discussing how such an assessment might be 
made without regard to the adoptive parents' race. 
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The new statutes are an improvement over California's 
previous preference scheme in that they do not require a wait-
ing period before a multiracial family may even be consid-
ered.260 The new laws, however, may not go far enough be-
cause they do not explicitly prohibit racial matching in adop-
tion placement decisions.261 The statutes no longer require 
race to be a factor in decisions, but neither do they prohibit it. 
The problem with this is that it allows agencies to continue 
their current practices.262 
That is exactly what happened when Connecticut made a 
similar change in its adoption laws.263 Connecticut amended 
its adoption laws in 1986 to prohibit denials of adoptions for 
foster children "solely on the basis of a difference in race" be-
tween the child and potential adoptive parents.264 The task 
260. A three-month waiting period was actually required under former CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 8708(c) (West 1994) (repealed 1995), supra note 256. 
261. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (West Supp. 1996) provides in relevant part: 
The department or licensed adoption agency. . . may 
consider the cultural, ethnic, or racial background of the 
child and the capacity of the prospective adoptive parent 
to meet the needs of a child of this background as one of 
a number of factors used to determine the best interests 
of the child. 
[d. The statute does not say whether the parents' race may enter into such a 
determination. See infra part VII.B for a discussion of how such an assessment 
night be made without regard to the race of the adopting parent or parents. 
262. A Senate bill sponsored by Senators Howard Metzenbaum and Carol 
Mosely-Braun would deny federal funding to any adoption agency which delays or 
denies adoptions based solely on race. Some adoption experts criticize the bill 
saying it does not go far enough and will allow race-matching to continue as' long 
as race is not the only factor in denying an adoption. Albert R. Hunt, People and 
Politics; Metzenbaum Breaches the Adoption Color Barner, WALL ST. J., July 14, 
1994, available in WESTLAW, WSJ Database. See infra Section VII, which recom-
mends strengthening statutes such as these by expressly prohibiting consideration 
of the adoptive parents' race in making placement decisions. 
263. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1185, n. 56. 
264. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726 (West, 1996), previously at CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 45-611, provides: 
[d. 
If the commissioner of children and youth services is 
appointed as statutory parent for any child free for adop-
tion . . . said commissioner shall not refuse to place such 
child with any prospective adoptive parent solely on the 
basis of a difference in race. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727(c)(3) (West 1996) provides that courts 
may not disapprove any other adoption solely because of a difference in race, col-
or, or religion. [d. 
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force appointed to implement the new law, however, proposed 
practices promoting a preference for same-race placement.265 
California's new law is very similar to Connecticut's in that it 
prohibits consideration of race as the sole factor in adoption 
placement decisions, without explicitly prohibiting an agency 
preference for race-matched families.266 If anything, the Cali-
fornia statute does more than the Connecticut statute to en-
courage consideration of race as a factor, since it expressly 
permits the child's race to be a factor in making a determina-
tion of the child's best interests.267 When the law allows race 
to be a factor in adoption placement decisions at all, it is often 
the decisive factor.268 
Even where the law does not require race-matching prefer-
ence schemes, the "unwritten rules" and practices of adoption 
agencies do require such schemes.269 Too often, courts are un-
willing or unable to second-guess the agencies' decisions. In 
Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's 
Services,27o for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized that race was "given substantial weight" in an 
agency's decision to remove a biracial foster child from the 
home of white foster parents who wanted to adopt him.271 
The court held that such consideration was proper as long as it 
"was not an automatic-type of thing ... that is, that all blacks 
go to black families, all whites go to white families, and all 
mixed children go to black families, which would be prohibit-
ed.,,272 The Drummond court accepted the trial court's finding 
that race was not the only factor in the agency's decision.273 
265. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1185, n. 56 
(citing TASK FORCE ON TRANSRAClAL ADOPl'ION, OFFICE OF POLICY AND MANAGE-
MENT, COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING DMSION, A STUDY OF TRANSRAClAL ADOPl'ION IN 
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 7, 27 (1988». 
266. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(a) (West Supp. 1996), supra note 257. 
267. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (West Supp. 1996), supra note 261. The Connecti-
cut statute does not contain such a provision. See supra note 260. 
268. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1239. 
269. [d. at 1184-1185. 
270. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Services, 563 
F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977). 
271. [d. at 1201, 1203, 1204. They had raised him since he was one month old 
and had been excellent parents to him during the three years he was in their 
care. 
272. [d. at 1204, quoting and approving the trial court's ruling. 
273. [d. at 1204. 
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Yet, nowhere does the opinion suggest what factors, other than 
race, played a role in the agency's decision.274 Allowing agen-
cies and courts to consider race as one of many factors in de-
termining the best interests of the child thus allows the status 
quo to continue. 
One problem courts face in reviewing adoption and foster 
care placement decisions is that it is very difficult if not impos-
sible to know for certain which factors were crucial to a place-
ment decision.275 Eliminating the use of race as a permissible 
factor would eliminate the possibility that race could remain a 
decisive factor in practice. Race cannot be the decisive factor if 
it cannot be a factor at all. 
2. Considering the Child's Existing Bonds With Foster Par-
ents 
While failing to adequately protect against the harms of 
race-matching, California's new law more effectively addresses 
the problems that inhere in a system which removes children 
from foster parents or other care-givers by requiring that foster 
parents be considered as adoptive parents for the children in 
their care.276 The statute does not require that the foster par-
ents be given preference in placement, only that they be con-
274. [d. at 1219 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). "In any event, there was no record, 
there was no transcript of testimony, there is no indication that any word about 
other reasons than Timmy's race went into any decision-making ... " [d. 
275. Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1219 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). 
276. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710 (West Supp. 1996), enacted with §§ 8708 & 8709, 
provides in part: 
[d. 
(T]he foster parent or parents shall be considered with 
respect to {placement 00 the child along with all other 
prospective adoptive parents where all of the following are 
true: 
(a) The child has been in foster care with the foster par-
ent or parents for a period of more than four months. 
(b) The child has substantial emotional ties to the foster 
parent or parents. 
(c) The child's removal from the foster home would be 
seriously detrimental to the child's well-being. 
(d) The foster parent or parents have made a written 
request to be considered to adopt .the child. 
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sidered.277 It does, however, require an assessment of the ef-
fect of removal from the foster home on the child in requiring 
agencies to consider whether removal will be "seriously detri-
mental to the child.,,278 It also requires courts to look at the 
emotional bonds between the child and the foster parents.279 
It is difficult to see how, after finding that a child has emotion-
al bonds with her foster parents and that removal from the 
foster home would be detrimental, an agency could find that 
adoption by prospective parents other than the foster parents 
would be in the child's best interest. 
B. MAINE: EVALUATING EXISTING EMOTIONAL BONDS IN DE-
TERMINING THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST 
Maine has similarly addressed these problems by requir-
ing that courts consider the child's bonds with potential adop-
tive parents in determining the best interests of the child.280 
Emphasizing these bonds in decisions about adoptive place-
ment would prevent needless trauma to children separated 
from loving foster parents in favor of strangers who more near-
ly match an adoption agency's profile of a proper parent for 
that child.281 Because of the importance of stable relation-
277. Id. 
278. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710(d) (West Supp. 1996), supra note 276. 
279. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710(c) (West Supp. 1996), supra note 276. 
280. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(2) (West Supp. 1997) provides in part: 
In detennining the best interests of the adoptee, the court 
shall consider and evaluate the following factors to give 
the adoptee a permanent home at the earliest possible 
date: 
(A) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing 
between the adoptee and the adopting person or persons, 
the birth parent or birth parents or the putative father. 
Id. 
Foster parents and the children in their care often share emotional bonds. 
See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. 
281. See e.g., In re Jasmon 0., 878 P.2d 1297, 1305 (Cal. 1994), supra notes 
118-128 and accompanying text, where the child was so traumatized at the pros-
pect of being separated from her foster parents that she developed a mental ill-
ness, called separation anxiety disorder. This case, while illustrative of the prob-
lems children face when separated from loving care-givers, dealt with a failed 
attempt to reunite the child with her birth father rather than a decision to allow 
someone other than her foster parents to adopt her. See also McLaughlin v. 
Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1988), where a child developed a severe 
depression of childhood as a result of being removed from his foster home; and In 
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ships in the lives of children, the focus should be on this factor, 
rather than on factors which have nothing to do with parenting 
ability. 
C. MICHIGAN: PROTECTING AGAINST MORE THAN RACIAL DIS~ 
CRIMINATION 
Michigan amended its adoption laws in 1994 to prohibit 
adoption agencies from discriminating against potential adop-
tive parents on the grounds of age, race, religion, disability, or 
income leveL282 The benefit of such a scheme is that it opens 
more potential adoptive homes for waiting children. By provid-
ing more placement options, the new law better safeguards the 
rights of children to a stable and permanent home. 
There are two important reasons to extend adoption re-
forms beyond race discrimination, as Michigan has done. First 
of all, factors such as age, religion, ethnicity, and marital sta-
tus have little to do with parental fitness. 283 It is equally dev-
re M.D., Jr., 653 A.2d 873, 876-877 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995), where the relationship 
that had developed between a foster mother and her 3-year-old foster son was a 
factor in the decision to allow her to adopt the child. 
[d. 
282. MICH. COMPo LAwS ANN. § 722.957(1) (West Supp. 1996) provides: 
[A]n adoption facilitator shall not refuse to provide servic-
es to a potential adoptive parent based solely on age, 
race, religious affiliation, disability, or income level. A 
child placing agency shall not make placement decisions 
based solely on age, race, religious affiliation, disability, 
or income level. 
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957(3) (West Supp. 1996) provides: 
[d. 
In an adoption in which a [birth] parent or guardian 
selects or participates in the selection of the adoptive 
parent, an adoption facilitator shall allow the [birth] par-
ent or guardian the option of selecting from the . . . en-
tire pool of potential adoptive parents who have been 
determined suitable to be adoptive parents. 
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957 (West Supp. 1996). See also WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 48.82(5) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that "[a]lthough otherwise qualified, 
no person shall be denied the benefits of this section because the person is deaf, 
blind or has other physical handicaps."); and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-
727(c)(3) (West 1996) (prohibiting courts from denying adoptions "solely because of 
an adopting parent's marital status or because of a difference in race, color or 
religion . . . or because the adoption may be subsidized ... "). 
283. See Hollinger, supra note 3, at 48, pointing out that such factors "may 
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astating for children to be removed from a foster home for per-
manent placement elsewhere when the reason for the removal 
is the foster parent's age or marital status.2M 
A second reason to prohibit the use of discriminatory crite-
ria in adoption placement decisions is the effect of combining 
such factors with race-matching. The current law is that race 
may be a factor as long as it is not the only factor.285 In cases 
where, for example, both race and age are factors, courts may 
have no grounds on which to overturn a decision based entirely 
on discriminatory factors. In Child v. Stangler, for instance, a 
single foster mother challenged a denial of her petition to 
adopt her foster daughter.286 Factors in the denial were the 
foster mother's race, age, and marital status.287 The United 
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held 
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case since there 
were clearly grounds for the agency decision other than 
race.288 According to the court, the consideration of the foster 
have only questionable relevance to ... parenting skills." See supra part V.C. for 
a discussion of the limits of any benefit to screening on the basis of age and mar-
ital status. See generally BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4. 
284. See, e.g., In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. 1973), where the biological 
grandparents of a three-year-old boy sought to adopt him. They had cared for him 
since birth at the request of the child's birth mother (the birth father was their 
son). Id. at 866. The trial court denied the adoption primarily because of the 
grandparents' age, although their failure to make sure their eight grown children 
finished high school and some possible health problems were also factors. Id. at 
869. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed, giving decisive weight to the trau-
ma the child would likely suffer if separated from his grandparents, whom he saw 
as his parents. Id. at 872. 
285. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1239. See 
also McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1988), where, ex-
plaining its decision to overturn a foster care placement decision, the court noted 
that "defendants were unable to show that the Department's decision to remove 
Raymond Bullard from the McLaughlins was based upon any reason other than 
that of race." The McLaughlin court found race was the sole factor, but it is often 
difficult to so find. Cf. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and 
Children's Services, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977). 
286. Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850-CV-W-6, 1992 WL 396318 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 
28, 1992). The case was an equal protection challenge to a state court ruling. Id. 
at *1. 
287. Id. at *2. The brief opinion did not discuss any evidence of the foster 
mother's parenting skills or her relationship with the child. There was also no 
mention of how long the child had been in her care. 
288. Id. The court explained, however, that she would be able to appeal to the 
Missouri state courts. Id. In a footnote which cited McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. 
Supp. 318, (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd 867 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989), infra notes 300-303 
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mother's age and single status were enough to defeat her equal 
protection claim, which could be sustained only if race were 
the only factor in the denial.289 Thus, consideration of factors 
such as age and marital status can defeat a challenge to an 
essentially race-based adoption decision. 
The Michigan law has two weaknesses, however. First, the 
law does not prohibit consideration of these factors; it merely 
says they may not be the "sole" reason for a placement deci-
sion.290 This leaves open the possibility that agencies will 
continue to use these factors to deny adoptions.291 In spite of 
laws on the books giving single adults the right to adopt, agen-
cies regularly deny adoptions based on marital status.292 Sim-
ilarly, in spite of adoption laws with no maximum age limit for 
adoptive parents, agencies routinely deny adoptions on the 
basis of age.293 As with race, then, an outright prohibition on 
considering these criteria is necessary to prevent agencies from 
using these discriminatory factors as decisive factors in deny-
ing adoptions. 
The second weakness in the Michigan law is that it gives 
only a finite list of factors which cannot be used to deny an 
adoption, rather than eliminating any standards which would 
be discriminatory in any area of the law other than adoption. 
The law does not address instances where agencies screen out 
potential parents because of their marital status or ethnicity, 
for example. Such standards can needlessly delay adoption 
placements just as much as the factors addressed by the Michi-
gan law.294 For these reasons, this comment will recommend 
and accompanying text, the court suggested the foster mother might be able to 
challenge the state court's factual findings that she would be unable to "help the 
child learn about her ethnic heritage and culture and give her cultural support" in 
a state appeals court. Child, 1992 WL 396318. at *2 and n.3. With the foster 
mother's age and marital status remaining as permissible factors, however, it 
would be quite possible for such a challenge to result in reversing the trial court's 
factual finding on her ability to meet her foster daughter's cultural needs without 
reversing the denial of adoption. Her age and marital status would be enough to 
support the denial. Id. at *2. 
289. Child, 1992 WL 396318 at *2. 
290. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.957(1) (West Supp. 1996), supra note 282. 
291. See supra part VI.A. for a discussion of the ineffectiveness of similar lan-
guage in statutes meant to limit race-matching. 
292. See supra note 8. 
293. Id. 
294. One agency refused for three years to place Haitian twin babies for adop-
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completely eliminating any discriminatory factors from adop-
tion decisions, and require that courts and agencies focus in-
stead on prospective adoptive parents as individuals. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE 
SCREENING SYSTEM 
Children suffer when agencies delay adoptive placements 
in the hopes of finding married parents young enough to have 
biological children, both of whom are the same race as the 
child. They suffer when their emotional bonds with foster par-
ents are severed so agencies can instead place them with 
young, married, same-race strangers.295 They suffer when 
they are moved from one foster home to another for many 
years and deprived of an opportunity to form parent-child 
bonds at all. 296 The current trend towards eliminating the 
use of race as the "sole factor" in denying adoptive placements 
is a step in the right direction, but it does not adequately pro-
tect the interests of children waiting for adoptive homes. Adop-
tion reform laws must completely eliminate any factors which 
would be discriminatory in other areas of the law from consid-
eration in adoption placement decisions; otherwise, such fac-
tors will continue to be decisive. 
This comment recommends that adoption placement deci-
sions be based solely on assessment of the personal qualities 
which make for excellent parenting, qualities such as patience, 
affection, maturity, and motivation to parent.297 The focus 
should be on the prospective adoptive parents' bonds with the 
child they seek to adopt, where possible, both because of the 
critical importance of these relationships to the child and be-
cause of the opportunity such a focus affords adoption agency 
workers to assess the parents' ability to raise the individual 
child they seek to adopt. This comment therefore recommends 
tion while it searched for Haitian parents who spoke French. Only after three 
years did the agency allow an African-American couple who did not speak French 
to adopt the twins. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? silpra note 6, at 
1187, n. 60. 
295. See supra note 281. 
296. See supra notes 148-149. 
297. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text. 
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giving preference to a child's actual care-givers in placement 
decisions. This comment further recommends providing a rem-
edy for violations of these standards, which would make the 
proposed reforms more effective. 
A. A PREFERENCE FOR ACTUAL CARE-GIVERS 
A requirement that courts and agencies give priority to 
requests by potential adoptive parents who are actual care-
givers of the children they seek to adopt would vastly improve 
the screening system.29B The Maine adoption law discussed in 
part VI.B. would serve as a model because it specifically man-
dates consideration of the emotional bonds between children 
and potential adoptive parents in determining the ability of 
those parents to care for the child.299 Stability in early child-
hood is the most significant factor in the success of adop-
tions.30o Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of these parent-child 
bonds when extending constitutional protection for family 
relationships.301 
Another advantage of priority consideration for actual 
care-givers' adoption petitions is that such a practice would 
298. This comment refers to actual care-givers as any parents who are already 
raising the child they seek to adopt, including foster parents or grandparents or 
other relatives. The idea of giving priority to such potential adoptive parents 
would be to require agencies to ftrst consider their petitions to adopt before mov-
ing on to consider other potential parents. 
299. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 1129(2)(A) (West Supp. 1997), supra note 
280. 
300. Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? supra note 6, at 1224, n. 164 
(citing W. FEIGELMAN & A. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN: NEW PATTERNS OF 
ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 92-93 (1983», pointing out that the disruption and dis-
continuity in the lives of children before they are placed in a permanent adoptive 
home are the reason early placement is so important for children's well-being. 
301. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248 (1983) and Quilloin v. Walcott 
434 U.S. 246 (1978) (holding that unwed biological fathers did not have a constitu-
tionally protected interest in maintaining their relationships with children for 
whom they took no responsibility); Smith v. Organization of Foster Fatnilies for 
Equality and Reform 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (discussing in dicta the importance of 
emotional bonds within fatnilies to the constitutional protection of family relation-
ships); Stanley v. lllinois 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding it unconstitutional to re-
move children from an unwed father who had established parent-child bonds with 
his children and taken responsibility for their care). See supra Part IV, Constitu-
tional Protection of the Family, for a discussion of this issue. 
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give agencies and courts ample evidence with which to assess 
parental fitness on an individual basis. When considering the 
adoption petition of potential parents who are already caring 
for the child they seek to adopt, courts or agencies have before 
them evidence of those parents' ability to raise that child. That 
is, they have before them evidence of how the child and par-
ents interact, what their relationship is like, and how the child 
is developing under their care. Such evidence is not available 
in considerations of other potential adoptive parents. Thus, 
giving priority consideration to potential adoptive parents 
already caring for a child serves the best interest of the child 
both by preserving the child's emotional bonds and by allowing 
courts and adoption agencies the opportunity to base their 
decision on the information most likely to help them accurately 
predict successful parenting. 
B. AsSESSING PARENTS ONLY AS INDIVIDUALS 
Although it is not possible to base an assessment of poten-
tial adoptive parents who are not already caring for a child on 
their relationship with that child, they too should be assessed 
as individuals without regard to discriminatory factors. Some 
of these potential adoptive parents may already have children, 
in which case adoption agency workers can assess their 
parenting ability based on their relationships with these chil-
dren.302 Such an inquiry is, of course, not possible for pro-
spective parents seeking to adopt their first child. Many such 
prospective parents may, however, have significant contacts 
with the children of friends or relatives. Asking about interac-
tions with such children might also give adoption agency work-
ers a picture of the prospective parents' ability to care for a 
child of their own. Moreover, personality traits such as warmth 
and affection, maturity, and stability are far more important to 
a meaningful parent-child relationship than are factors such as 
race, marital status or age.303 
302. See, e.g., BURGESS, supra note 80, at 3, telling the story of one adoptive 
family with whom she placed a baby boy. Burgess began her investigation of their 
parental fitness by visiting the family's home and observing the parents' interac-
tions with their daughter. Id. 
303. "Personal qualities of the adoptive parents are of paramount importance; 
the age, income and social class are far less important." In re Tachick, 210 
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Race need not be a factor in deciding whether adoptive 
parents will be able to meet a child's needs for cultural aware-
ness and positive racial identity. In McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 
for example, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania made an individual assessment of this ability 
while hearing a challenge to an agency's decision to remove a 
black foster child from the home of a white foster family.304 
The McLaughlin court recognized that while the child's severe 
depression after being removed from the only home he had 
known was a more pressing concern than his racial and cultur-
al needs, an inquiry into the McLaughlins' ability to meet 
those needs was nonetheless proper and relevant to the deci-
sion.305 In making such an inquiry, the court determined that 
the McLaughlins lived in a racially-integrated neighborhood, 
planned to send Raymond to a racially-integrated school, and 
would encourage him to learn about his racial heritage and 
play with both black children and white children.306 The 
court implied that such an inquiry was to be made regardless 
of the race of the foster parents involved.307 This case demon-
strates that courts and agencies can, and sometimes do, assess 
potential adoptive parents as individuals.30B An appropriate 
N.W.2d 865, 870, n.7 (Wis. 1973) (citing PRINGLE, ADOPTION FACTS AND FALLACIES: 
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND GREAT BRITAIN 
(1968)). See also BURGESS, supra note 80, at 14, noting that the only value of 
factors such as age and race to adoption agencies is to "limit the number of appli-
cants." 
304. McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 867 F.2d 
308 (3d Cir. 1989). The McLaughlins, a white couple, had cared for a black foster 
son, Raymond, since he was five months old. [d. at 319. After the McLaughlins 
had cared for Raymond for two years, the agency transferred him to an African-
American foster family. [d. at 321. Raymond had thrived in the McLaughlins' care 
and had developed deep emotional bonds with them. The agency removal was 
contrary to the recommendations of Raymond's case worker. [d. at 323. The 
McLaughlins challenged the agency's decision on due process and equal protection 
grounds. [d. at 319-20. 
305. McLaughlin, 693 F. Supp., at 324, 330. 
306. [d. at 330. 
307. [d. at 324. "This Court, however, does recognize that it must determine 
whether foster parents, such as the McLaughlins, can adequately provide for a 
foster child's racial and cultural needs." [d. The court gave no indication that such 
inquiry need only be made when the foster parents are white. The court cited 
evidence that some black parents were not able to provide adequate care to a 
child such as Raymond. [d. 
308. McLaughlin, at 324. "[T]he use of race as a factor... is not... 
'necessary' where a governmental entity such as this Court can make placement 
decisions on an individualized basis. [Placement] decisions made under these cir-
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reform statute would limit agencies to consideration of the 
personal qualities of individual parents by explicitly prohibit-
ing consideration of race and all other factors which do not 
relate to parenting ability. Such a statute might also include 
an illustrative list of permissible factors. 309 
C. A REMEDY FOR VIOLATIONS 
California Assemblyman Goldsmith, who proposed the 
amendments to California's adoption law discussed in the 
previous section, also proposed providing a remedy for viola-
tions of the new Family Code section prohibiting categorically 
denying adoptions based solely on race.310 One benefit is that 
a remedy would recognize that the current screening system 
does indeed cause harm, and would focus courts' attention on 
this harm. As such, the availability of a remedy might change 
the result in a case such as Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't 
of Family and Children's Services.311 The Drummond court 
cumstances should not be decided by use of pernicious generalizations but rather 
should be decided on individual merit." Id. at 324. 
In In re Tachick, 210 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. 1973), the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
made a similar assessment without regard to the age of the adopting parents. Id. 
at 870. The court considered the fact that the child's growth and development 
under their care were "beyond average for [his] age." Id. at 872. See also In re 
M.D., Jr., 653 A.2d 873 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995), where the court reversed a decision 
to deny the petition of a single foster mother to adopt her foster son after review-
ing evidence that she had been an excellent mother to the child for the three 
years he had been in her care. 
309. It would be too rigid to limit agencies to a finite list of characteristics to 
consider. "Putting families together in adoption is not a science. It is an art." 
BURGESS, supra note 80, at 14. So long as the statute is clear that only factors 
which relate directly to parenting ability of the parent as an individual rather 
than as a member. of a particular group, the law would serve its purpose. 
310. A.B. 1743 § 4, Cal. Leg., 1995-1996 Sess. (1995). The proposed version of 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(c) would have provided: 
"Any person iJijured by the violation of subdivision (a) by a public or private 
adoption agency may bring a civil action against that agency or entity for iJijunc-
tive relief or damages." A.B. 1743 § 4, Cal. Leg., 1995-1996 Sess. (1995). Subdivi-
sion (a) contains the provisions against using race as a sole reason for denying or 
delaying an adoption. Id. 
This proposed statute only would have provided a remedy where race was 
the sole factor in denying an adoption. The California reform law it was meant to 
enforce only prohibits the use of race as the sole factor in denying adoptions. See 
CAL. FAM CODE § 8708 (West SUpp. 1996), supra note 257, and CAL. FAM. CODE § 
8709 (West SUpp. 1996), supra note 261. 
311. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Services, 563 
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ignored not only the emotional bonds that had developed be-
tween the child and the foster parents who wished to adopt 
him, but also the possibility that the child might be adversely 
affected psychologically by the separation from the 
Drummonds.312 Had emotional injury to the child been an 
element of the Drummonds' claim, it would have been more 
difficult for the court to ignore this possibility.313 
Another benefit of such a remedy is that it would give 
these laws more bite. An example of the difficulty in imple-
menting reforms of the adoption screening system is the expe-
rience of Connecticut. There, an effort at reform was under-
mined when those charged with implementing a law prohibit-
ing race-based adoption denials proposed a plan for race-
matching.314 If a remedy is available, agencies may be more 
reluctant to continue using improper criteria in adoptive place-
ment decisions, while courts would be more aware of the issue. 
Thus, a remedy would help to effectuate the recommended 
reforms. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Families enjoy strong constitutional protection for reasons 
other than biological links. Among the reasons for this protec-
tion is the importance of the emotional bonds that connect 
family members. Preserving such bonds is critical to the emo-
tional well-being of young children. The California courts have 
recognized a fundamental right for children to a stable and 
secure family where these emotional bonds may be preserved 
and have suggested that such a right may be constitutionally 
mandated. The current system of screening adoptive parents is 
F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), supra notes 270-275 and accompanying text. 
312. [d. at 1208. There was no discussion in the opinion of possible harm to 
Timmy, although the independent attorney for the child submitted evidence of 
psychological literature proving the "traumatic effect of such moves on young chil-
dren." [d. 
313. The Drummond court did, however, manage to ignore the overwhelming 
evidence that race was in fact the sole factor in the decision to deny the 
Drummonds' request to adopt, which, even under existing law, was grounds for 
reversal. [d. at 1219 (Tuttle, J., dissenting). Therefore, it is far from certain that 
stronger laws would prevent any and all Drummond-like rulings. 
314. See supra notes 264-265 and accompanying text. 
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inconsistent with this protection and with the standard of "the 
best interests of the child," which is supposed to be central to 
all child placement decisions. Adoption laws which prohibit 
consideration of any factors other than the capacity of individ-
ual parents to love, nurture, and take care of a child, give 
preference to potential adoptive parents who are already tak-
ing care of the child, and provide a remedy for violations of 
these standards would more adequately protect the interests of 
children waiting for adoptive homes. 
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